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Abstract
This thesis explores civil religion in Canada. It examines the work of 
Rousseau, Durkheim, and the reintroduction of the concept of civil religion by Robert 
Bellah in 1967. Although some scholars argue that Canada does not possess a civil 
religion, this thesis asserts that a civil religion has been well manifested in Canadian 
society. Since Confederation, Canada has seen the rise and fall of Christian civic 
piety, something that once permeated public life in Canada. The thesis studies the 
metamorphosis of civil religion and its impact on public policy in education. It 
examines legal challenges concerning religion in the field of education as exemplars 
to examine this metamorphosis. This thesis concludes that education policy and 
court decisions reflect a new-found belief in democratic faith, which has replaced 
Christian civic piety as Canada’s civic religion. The conclusion raises questions 
about the capacity of this democratic faith to embrace religious pluralism.
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Introduction
In 1967, Robert Bellah published his acclaimed article, “Civil Religion in 
America” in the journal Daedalus. This article launched a debate in America about 
civil religion and the relationship between faith and government that continues to this 
day. For Bellah, American civil religion could best be summarized as a public 
religious dimension to American politics - an expressed “set of beliefs, symbols, and 
rituals that I am calling the American civil religion” (Bellah 1967 , 4). These symbols 
include public holidays, such as Memorial Day to honour the dead and the birthdays 
of Lincoln and Washington, the flag, the national anthem, and sacred founding 
documents of the American republic. Some of this debate eventually extended into 
Canada (Bellah and Hammond 1980; Kim 1993). Canadian civil religion, as it 
existed, was more influenced by traditional, Christian religious fervour. This thesis 
examines contemporary civil religion in Canada and compares it with its more 
traditional identity. Ronald Beiner captures the essence of civil religion best. Beiner 
writes
Civil religion is the empowerment of religion, not for the sake of 
religion, but for the sake of enhanced citizenship -  of making members 
of the political community better citizens, in accordance with whatever 
conception one holds of what constitutes being a good citizen'1 (Beiner 
2011, 2) .
One may question why the topic of civil religion matters at all today in an 
increasingly secular age. One need only look back to Bellah and other writers on 
the topic for the answer to this question. Robert Stauffer writes “the collective 
meaning ultimately derives not from a belief that society is good, but from belief that 
society has a special responsibility to try to be good. Thus, the civil religion always
1
confronts the nation with a potential judgment over nationalistic idolatry” (Stauffer 
1975, 390). Stauffer argues that civil religion does not make a nation more 
nationalistic except when it is abused. This is a very important contribution to the 
field, because the power of civil religion means that it could be easily abused to 
wrong ends. Stauffer touches on a theme resulting from one of Bellah’s subsequent 
works as well. Stauffer writes that Bellah believes
cultural change is also needed because political change can no longer 
focus only on “negative freedom” the extension and protection of civil 
rights and liberties nor even on more equity in the distribution of 
wealth, but must include new goals which offer the possibility of 
“positive freedom” -  of the freedom to exercise personal restraint and 
to act responsibly toward others which comes from a strongly shared 
sense of community (Stauffer 1975, 391).
The attachment to community which Stauffer and Bellah have both written about is 
what endows civil religion with its importance to contemporary Canada. The 
Canadian context is different from the context in the United States as there was no 
revolutionary zeal in Canada to promote the concept and transcendentalism of 
American civil religion. It is the absence of this zealous transcendentalism that leads 
some scholars such as Bellah, Kim and Hammond to at different times suggest that 
Canada is without a common civil religion. The country, it is argued, is too fractured 
due to linguistic, regional, and cultural differences fora common civil religion to exist. 
One critic, Andrew Kim, acknowledges however, that perhaps an argument can be 
made for multiple civil religions in Canada. This thesis recognizes two founding civil 
religions in Canada, one in Quebec - mostly Roman Catholic and French speaking - 
and one in the rest of Canada - primarily Protestant and English speaking. I 
highlight the overlap between these two civic faiths and identify the common
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features as Christian civic piety. Since 1982, however, Canada has witnessed the 
development of a new, unified civil religion, akin to what von Heyking refers to as a 
“democratic faith.” This thesis reflects on the emergence and consequences of this 
new civil religion, and asks if new tensions between state and society have emerged 
as a result of this new civil'religion.
I argue that Canada has always had a civil religion and that the nature of civil 
religion changed from a Durkheimian based Christian Civic Piety to a Rousseauian 
democratic faith. This means that the organs of the state have been facilitators of 
the change that has happened in Canada. I will do this by first examining what 
constitutes civil religion. I will then look specifically at the case of Canadian civil 
religion and how it has changed. I will argue that there have been three factors that 
have influenced this change: The Quiet revolution in Quebec, the recognition of the 
multicultural reality in Canada through the formal adoption the multicultural policy 
and the adoption of the Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These three 
factors are most evident in the evolution of education policy. With specific reference 
to court cases that deal with religion in the schools I argue that the Rousseauian 
model of civil religion has emerged in Canada.
This thesis thus examines three interrelated questions: first, what is civil 
religion, second, does Canada have a civil religion, and third, what is the relevance 
of civil religion in contemporary Canada? To address these questions, the thesis is 
structured as follows: Chapter One will review the literature on civil religion. Here, 
various explanations and functions of civil religion are identified, particularly relevant 
to the relationship between state and society. In Chapter Two, I will examine civil
religion in the Canadian context, and will identify a transformation of Canadian’s civil 
religion from Christian civic piety to a new democratic faith. This may seem like a 
rather benign development, but this transformation reflects a shift in the relationship 
between state and society. To explore this shift in greater detail, I will next focus on 
public education. In Chapter Three, I turn towards the role of civil religion in public 
education and chronicle the role of Christian civic piety in public schools prior to the 
transformation noted in Chapter Two. Then, in Chapter Four I examine the 
replacement of Christian civic piety by democratic faith in public schools. To 
examine this development, this thesis focusses on court cases which reflect the 
changing nature of religious education and religious exercises in schools. Education 
is a critical intersection between state and society and therefore illustrates the 
impact and consequences of Canada’s new civil religion.
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Chapter One: Studies in Civil Religion
This chapter reviews prominent studies on civil religion. It focusses on the 
work of three different authors: Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile Durkheim, and 
Robert Bellah, and draws a distinction between civil religions that emerge from 
society and those shaped by the state.
Writing in 18th century France, Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that “a 
lengthy alteration of feelings and ideas is necessary before man can be resolved to 
accept a fellow man as a master, in the hope that things will turn out well for having 
done so” (Rousseau 1987, 220). In the Social Contract, in which Rousseau 
explored the principles and rights that would lay the foundation for a republic, he 
recognized that “a state has never been founded without religion serving at its base,” 
and argued that man had “no other kings than the gods, and no other government 
than a theocratic one” (Rousseau 1987, 220). Rousseau recognized the great need 
for sovereign power to inspire people to become good and tolerant citizens, subject 
to one master. He claimed, however, that it was impossible for one to be subject to 
both the church and to the state: the tension of serving two masters would lead to 
social disunity, which was to be avoided at all costs (Rousseau 1987, 223). He thus 
proposed the idea of a civil religion, “a civic faith to be created and imposed by the 
sovereign as a way of promoting civic virtues and political unity” (Cristi 1997, 19).
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Rousseau wrote his chapter on civil religion precisely because he believed that it 
was impossible to separate the temporal and the spiritual.1
In the Social Contract, Rousseau attempts a juggling act in that he professes 
the need for a state to be sacrosanct and possess a divine and enduring purpose in 
order to command the loyalty of its citizens. This civic responsibility and duty to 
transcend, however, must be accomplished without the strength of an outside 
church, as that would require the people to serve two masters. The awkward 
juggling is first evident in his expressed concerns with Christianity. On one hand, he 
acknowledges its moral strength and capacity to encourage equality and fraternity, 
but on the other hand notes its weakness in that it can divert people away from the 
affairs of earthly things and fails to provide a foundation for a vibrant civic identity. 
Despite praise for the gospel of Christianity, he criticizes its political utility: 
“Christianity preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to 
tyranny...” In this regard, Rousseau is caught between moral philosophy and 
political theory. The Social Contract is both a moral and a political treatise in which 
Rousseau attempts to contribute to both fields in the same work (Fourny 1987, 485).
For Rousseau, the purposes of a civil religion were quite clear and he labeled 
them in the simplest of terms:
For it is of great importance to the state that each citizen should have a 
religion that causes him to love his duties. But the dogmas of that 
religion are of no interest either to the state or to its members, except 
to the extent that these dogmas relate to morality and to the duties
1 Some contemporary scholars of Rousseau have attempted to separate the temporal and 
spiritual, although Diane Fourny has explained how such efforts are clearly at odds with Rousseau's 
original intent. See Diane Fourny," Rousseau’s Civil Religion Considered " The French Review 60, 
no. 4 (1 9 8 7 )
which the one who professes them is bound to fulfill toward others.
Each man can have in addition such opinions as he pleases, without it 
being any of the sovereign’s business to know what they are. For 
since the other world is outside the province of the sovereign, whatever 
the fate of the subjects in the life to come, it is none of its business, so 
long as they are good citizens in this life.
There is, therefore, a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of 
which it belongs to the sovereign to establish, not exactly as dogmas of 
religion, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible 
to be a good citizen or a faithful subject. While not having the ability to 
obligate anyone to believe them, the sovereign can banish from the 
state anyone who does not believe them. It can banish him not for 
being impious but for being unsociable, for being incapable of sincerely 
loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing his life, if necessary, for 
his duty. If, after having publicly acknowledged these same dogmas, a 
person acts as if he does not believe them, he should be put to death; 
he has committed the greatest of crimes: he has lied before the laws.
The dogmas of the civil religion ought to be simple, few in number, 
precisely worded, without explanations or commentaries. The 
existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficient divinity that foresees 
and provides; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the 
punishment of the wicked; the sanctity of the social contract and of the 
laws. These are the positive dogmas. As for the negative dogmas, I 
limiting them to just one, namely intolerance. It is part of the cults we 
have excluded (Rousseau 1987, 226).
Rousseau’s civil religion is meant to be a catch-all of how people were to live, and 
how the state or sovereign was to “fix the articles.” This would be done by 
encapsulating the concept of civil religion as described in the “positive dogmas.” 
The primary purpose of civil religion for Rousseau is to articulate and promote the 
“sentiments of sociability” and to unify authority. If the church and the state were 
separate, the people would have two masters and it would not be possible for 
citizens to serve either completely. This was precisely the reason Rousseau 
dismissed a third type of religion. If the first type of religion was that of the pure 
Gospel, internal to each person and without any interference from external bodies, 
and the second was a common set of national values, the third type of religion or
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“priestly religion” must be dismissed outright, as it cultivated competing identities and 
rival allegiances, “two sets of legislation, two leaders and two homelands” 
(Rousseau 1987, 223). Rousseau’s civil religion was meant as a way to especially 
avoid this third type of religion. It would be acceptable for people to indulge in 
Rousseau’s first type of religion because that would be a private matter between the 
individual and God. As long as the person embraced the civil religion as put forward 
by the state, all would be well.
By focusing on this “civil religion,” Rousseau believed he had articulated a 
foundation for republican government and resolved the complicated relationship 
between individual sentiments and civic duties and obligations. Because Christianity 
could not fully fit the political needs of a republic, a civil religion was required. How 
well such a civil religion could reflect the spiritual and moral values of a society, and 
how such a civil religion risked promoting the interests of the state over the 
sentiments of society, however, remained to be seen. Rousseau’s naive belief in 
the transparency of the General Will overshadowed the tensions that might exist 
between these two very different purposes, an assumption of coincidence that has 
been at the core of rival interpretations of his work.
Like Rousseau, Emile Durkheim also recognized that religion had rich 
capacity to cultivate moral obligation within the individual and to strengthen social 
integration. Durkheim, however, focused on religion as the natural and spontaneous 
activity of a moral community, an organic and natural unifying force as opposed to 
Rousseau’s more political, civil religion advanced by the state. Much of Durkheim’s 
work addressed the normlessness of modern society. His earlier work on suicide
focused on the concept of anomie, and elsewhere he resisted the atomistic drift of 
most Enlightenment philosophy. His enduring concern for social order thus 
culminated in his work on religion. In his last major work, The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, Durkheim described religion as the most important integrating 
element for society (Emile Durkheim, 1915). With religion seemingly in decline in 
the modern world, Durkheim wondered if society might disintegrate. But he 
recognized religion beyond its institutions and creeds and noted that religion, above 
all else, was a “transcendental representation of the power of society" (Coser 1977, 
138). Religion was therefore not merely a social creation, but society, divinized 
(Coser 1977, 138). Although Durkheim himself never used the specific term civil 
religion, his contributions to the study of religion in society and civil religion are 
significant (Cristi 1997). Durkheim believed that “there can be no society which does 
not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective 
sentiments and collective ideas which make its unity and its personality” (Cristi 1997, 
39). Durkheim thus filled a gap between Rousseau and later scholars of civil religion 
in that he provides a less strict version of civil religion.
With Durkheim, one sees attention to a societal based, bottom up version of 
civil religion that is in contrast to a more statist model espoused by Rousseau. 
Durkheim stated,
From the mere fact that we consider an object worthy of being loved 
and sought after, it does not follow that we feel ourselves stronger 
afterwards; it is also necessary that this object set free energies 
superior to these which we ordinarily have at our command and also 
that we have some means of making these enter into us and unite 
themselves to our interior lives. Now for that, it is not enough that we 
think of them; it is also indispensable that we place ourselves within
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their sphere of action, and that we set ourselves where we may best 
feel their influence; in a word, it is necessary that we act, and that we 
repeat the acts thus necessary every time we feel the need of 
renewing their effects (Emile Durkheim 1915,417).
Durkheim further notes,
the cult is not simply a system of signs by which the faith is outwardly 
translated; it is a collection of the means by which this is created and 
recreated periodically. Whether it consists in material acts or mental 
operations, it is always this which is efficacious” (Emile Durkheim 1915, 417).
Durkheim here is pointing out that it is important to the symbols and structure of the 
religion that the people practice what they believe. In this sense, his connection to 
civil religion is clear because civil religion is not just about what a society sees and 
does, but also what they believe. If a particular society does not have a strong 
foundation of some kind of self-sustaining idealism, it is likely to falter. This is where 
civil religion can, and in many societies does, play a role. In the United States, the 
ongoing belief in American exceptionalism is part of their civil religion. In Canada, 
the past role of Protestant and Roman Catholic religions made up its fundamental 
parts of its civil religion.
A key difference between Rousseau and Durkheim is the role society plays in 
the development of the individual. For Rousseau, society and individual must 
conform to the General Will. For Durkheim, the role of society is to provide a 
“refuge”, “a shield,” and a “guardian support which attaches the believer to his cult” 
(Emile Durkheim 1915, 418). This demonstrates that the role of society is crucial to 
the role of religion. As Demerath notes, “individuals take their moral cores from 
society rather than imparting morality to it” (Demerath 2003, 350).
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Durkheim notes that “a society is not made up merely of the mass of 
individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things which they 
use, and the movements which they perform, but above all is the idea which it forms 
of itse lf (Emile Durkheim 1915, 422). This is the central difference between 
Rousseau and Durkheim. As I have shown, Rousseau wanted society and the 
people to be subject to the civil religion of the state for political purposes, including 
receiving their moral grounding from the state. For Durkheim, this would not be 
possible, as society is made up of people, and the people get their moral codes from 
society, rather than the state.
Most of the body of work on civil religion today appears to have adopted the 
Durkheimian definition or structure. John Wilson states that the concept of civil 
society “concerns the possibility that specific social and cultural beliefs, behaviors 
and institutions constitute a positive religion concerned with civil order in the society” 
(Wilson 1986, 111). Flere and Lavric define civil religion as a concept which “refers 
to a set of values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes by which a given society is sacralized 
and its substance is comprehended in a transcendent way, the society being 
ascribed a transcendent mission, and its political authority [having] a charismatic 
dimension” (Flere and Lavric 2007, 595). Such definitions fit with the Durkheimian 
notion in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life that religion, its origin, its function 
and its meaning, can only be understood and explained by reference to society 
(Cristi 1997, 38).
The difference between the ideas of Rousseau and Durkheim are caught in 
this citation: “civil religion...may be seen either as a phenomenon expressing an
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inward conviction on the part of members of a certain group (implicit culture), or as a 
political resource -  a form of external compulsion or force used to support an 
existing political order” (Cristi 1997, 4). It is this difference in the utility of civil 
religion that marks the important distinction between Rousseau and Durkheim. As 
Cristi notes, civil religion is either a cultural given or a premeditated political 
ideology. In the latter, it is formulated to assert the interests of the state. Individual 
members of society are obligated to embrace it. Under Durkheim however, civil 
religion emerges from society itself and is part of the culture that reflects and 
promotes community norms and traditions.
Some five decades after Durkheim wrote The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life, Bellah launched what has become an ongoing discussion about civil 
religion in North America. In his article, “Civil Religion in America,” Bellah 
highlighted American civil religion specifically. He noted that “the civil religion at its 
best is a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious reality as 
seen in or, one could almost say, revealed through, the experience of the American 
people” (Bellah 1967, 12). Bellah’s work was largely a continuation of the work of 
Durkheim, but put into an American context. As Stauffer notes, Bellah argued that it 
was not surprising that a society should ‘sacralize its dominant values and that to 
dismiss this civil faith as nationalism was to overlook its ability to maintain a 
“cohesive and viable national society” (Stauffer 1975, 390). This clearly ties back 
into the work of Durkheim who believed that people derive their values from society, 
rather than the other way around.
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Bellah thus operationalized the idea of an American civil religion. Clearly 
influenced by Durkheim, Bellah’s work expanded the idea of civil religion in concrete 
terms. Bellah noted, for example, specific manifestations of civil religion in 
contemporary American politics. The historical references to a god, or a heavenly 
being, or providence are found throughout presidential inaugural addresses (Bellah 
1967, 1-21). There is, however, no reference to Christ or Christianity in this civic 
faith. Christianity is not even implicit, as there was to be a clear distinction between 
regular religion and what Bellah has termed the American civil religion. The 
American civil religion relied on those principles and experiences Americans held in 
common, rather than particular pieces of religious dogma. This civil religion was not 
founded on mere rituals, but on foundational ideals of American society. The 
strength of this society is what allowed the United States to flourish as a new nation. 
This is another link between Durkheim and Bellah. Bellah writes “the civil religion 
was not in the minds of Franklin, Washington, Jefferson or other leaders, with the 
exception of a few radicals like Tom Paine, ever felt to be a substitute for 
Christianity” (Bellah 1967, 8) Indeed, Bellah wrote, “this religion -  there seems no 
other word for it -  while not antithetical to and indeed sharing much in common with 
Christianity, was neither sectarian nor in any sense Christian” (Bellah 1967, 8). This 
can also be seen in the inaugural address of President John F. Kennedy when he 
references God three times, but not a specific God, as noted by Bellah.
The American Civil War was just such a shared experience in the 
development of that republic. As Bellah notes, the start of the civil war for Lincoln 
was about preserving the union of the states (Bellah 1967, 9). It is worth quoting
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from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, itself one of the sacred American canons. 
Lincoln ended the Gettysburg address by noting,
that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that 
cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion -  that we 
here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that 
this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth (Lincoln, 2013).
Bellah refers to the Gettysburg Address as a part of the “civil scriptures” of the 
American republic, effectively granting the Address canonical status.
In a further nod to the Durkheimian tradition, Bellah goes on to note some of 
the rituals and symbols of the American civil religion. The creation of Arlington 
National Cemetery, which Bellah calls the “most hallowed monument of the civil 
religion,” includes the war dead of both sides during the civil war, the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier, and the last remains of President Kennedy and the eternal flame. 
This cemetery forms a backbone of American civil religion precisely because it 
symbolizes the many meanings of this civil religion. The graves of the honored civil 
war dead of which Lincoln spoke and the celebrated dead of the subsequent wars, 
whom are buried in Arlington, honor America as a cause, a city on a hill, with its 
noble mission for freedom.
As for rituals, there are many in the American civil religion. One of the major 
rituals of American civil religion is the observance of Memorial Day. As Bellah notes, 
this is when the honoured dead and the principles for which they served and died 
are remembered, as are the living members of the Services. These Americans are 
remembered and honoured for their “spirit of sacrifice and to the American vision”
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(Bellah 1967, 11). Other rituals on the American civil religious calendar, according 
to Bellah, include the birthdays of Presidents Washington and Lincoln, the Fourth of 
July, and Veterans Day. Bellah also notes that public education plays a central role 
in civil rituals.
We have seen how Bellah described civil religion in America, and now I shall 
examine some of the defence of civil religion as written by Bellah, but much of which 
is still valid today. Bellah suggests that critics of American civil religion do so by 
holding up the best of their own religious creeds and practices and compare this to 
the worst of civil religion, whatever they feel that may be. Bellah makes a very 
strong argument when he states that “At its best, it [American civil religion] has never 
lacked incisive relevance to the American scene nor so particular that it has placed 
American society about universal human values” (Bellah 1967,12).
If one looks at Rousseau’s second type of religion and one recognizes that 
this could form the basis for a civil religious dogma in the service of the state, it 
becomes clear that civil religion might be little more than a servant of power and 
particular interests. Civil religion can be used to justify many actions, both for and 
against the people and society in question, as well as against foreign entities. Bellah 
concedes that the potential for tensions exist: President Lyndon B. Johnson 
appealed to civil religious beliefs to advocate both for voting rights for African 
Americans and for US involvement in Vietnam. Yet such endeavors were more than 
manipulations and resonate with the altruism of America’s civil faith. The idea 
behind both of these actions were that the American people would be acting in the
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interest of others, purely because it was the correct course of action, without any 
required reciprocal action on the part of the recipients.
Bellah concentrates his attention on the positive roles of civil religion. He 
highlights how American churches did not oppose the gradual development of a civil 
religion because a pan American creed did not threaten them. Instead, this civil faith 
worked in conjunction with established faiths in America. The many different 
denominations were able to continue their work because, according to Bellah, 
American civil religion was never anticlerical or militantly secular. This was because 
there was always a grounding of a common cause between the two, which was what 
de Tocqueville called a democratic and republican religion. Neither was the civil 
religion allied with any singular political interest: as far back as 1967, Bellah wrote 
that “for all the overt religiosity of the radical right today, their relation to the civil 
religious consensus is tenuous” (Bellah 1967, 14). Here Bellah was stating that 
even with the level of religiosity expressed by the some of the ‘right’ in America 
politics, they are not indicative of the civil religion Bellah wrote about. Their religious 
views were more exclusive than the civil religion views are required to be.
Bellah concludes with an impressive plea about civil religion in America when 
he writes,
[civil religion] does not make any decisions for us. It does not remove 
us from moral ambiguity, from being, in Lincoln’s fine phrase, an 
“almost chosen people”. But it is a heritage of moral and religious 
experience from which we still have much to learn as we formulate the 
decisions that lie ahead (Bellah 1967, 19).
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A central point to the study of civil religion is the distinction between two rival 
understandings of the term, and the separation of societal values from the values of 
the state. While there can certainly be some overlap between the two, the values of 
society or the people it represents are paramount in the Durkheimian approach to 
civil religion. In contrast, Rousseau’s ideal represents the needs and interests of the 
state as the most important. This does not mean that people sometimes do not help 
drive the values of the state, but use state institutions to impose their will on the rest 
of the population, as will be examined more closely in Chapter Four.
In 1974, Donald Jones and Russell Richey responded to Bellah’s celebrated 
article with a collection of essays that further explored and applied the concept of 
civil religion. Jones and Richey understood that the term meant different things to 
different people. They also recognized that civil religion was more than window 
dressing and that fundamental values and beliefs impacted public policy choices. In 
their work on civil religion, Jones and Richey attempted to operationalize the term 
and proposed a five-fold typology of civil religion to identify its multiple 
manifestations.
The first type identified by Jones and Richey is folk religion. They define this 
category of civil religion as,
...emerging out of the life of the folk. By examining the actual life, 
ideas, values, ceremonies, and loyalties of the people, conclusions are 
drawn as to the existence and status of civil religion, The starting point 
is not a normative view of what civil religion at best is but, rather, what 
it actually is on the basis of surveys, polls, and empirical studies 
(Jones and Richey 1974, 15).
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The second category is transcendent universal religion of the nation. “This civil 
religion stands in judgment over the folkways of the people” (Jones and Richey 
1974, 15). Sidney Mead views this as a prophetic faith, cosmopolitan in nature 
(Jones and Richey 1974, 15). The third category identified by Jones and Richey is 
religious nationalism. In this usage, the nation is not the church or national religion. 
Rather, it is “the object of adoration and glorification” (Jones and Richey 1974, 16). 
The fourth category is democratic faith. In this category, “the humane values and 
ideals of equality, freedom, and justice without the necessary dependence on a 
transcendent deity or a spiritualized nation represent civil religion at its best” (Jones 
and Richey 1974, 17). The final category identified by Jones and Richey is 
Protestant civic piety. The authors identify this as “the fusion of Protestantism and 
nationalism and the pervading Protestant coloring in the American ethos” (Jones and 
Richey 1974, 17).
These five different manifestations of civil religion are not mutually exclusive. 
In the next chapter, I investigate civil religion in Canada, and find that democratic 
faith and civic piety are most apparent. Yet the two interpretations of civil religion 
outlined here, between Rousseau and Durkheim, between the relative weight of 
state and society, are critical to understanding the different manifestations and 
dynamics of civil religion in Canada. I will return to these interpretations later in this 
thesis.
The fusion of the Protestantism and nationalism is known to Jones and 
Richey as Protestant civic piety, but in Canada, it is not so clear cut. In Canada, as 
this thesis discusses, there were two manifestations of civil religion, one in mainly
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French and Catholic Quebec, and one in the rest of mostly protestant Canada. 
Whereas the US has indeed been founded with a revolutionary zeal and the 
American dream, Canada has always had language, religious, and regional 
cleavages to separate us. What had united Canadians is their mutual Christianity, 
although in different denominations. What is now seen in Canada is the transition 
away from the separate Christian Civic Piety to the democratic faith that unites the 
country, similar to the United States civil religion.
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Chapter Two: Civil Religion in Canada: From Civic Piety to Democratic
Faith
The existence of a Canadian civil religion has been debated in the past. From the 
time of Canada’s inception it would be fair to say that there have been regional, 
linguistic, and religious tensions which militate against a strong sense of unity. 
Andrew Kim has argued that such tensions have prevented a pan-Canadian form of 
civil religion from developing. Bellah claims that the lack of revolutionary myth and 
founding has also inhibited the development of a pan-Canadian civil religion. This 
has changed over time. The adoption of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms was an explicit attempt to overcome such differences. Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau and his adherents in the constitutional patriation project were 
convinced that a more liberal rights oriented document was needed to replace the 
quasi-Burkean document and organization which had shaped Canada during its first 
century.2 A constitutional shift, however, involved more than legal documents. It 
also required more than a modest alteration of the values and symbols of the 
Canadian polity. This chapter examines civil religion in Canada and its 
transformation, and then explores the potential tensions and challenges that this 
transformation invites. These potential tensions become more evident as I apply the 
Durkheimian and Rousseauian models of civil religion identified in the previous 
chapter.
2 Von Heyking, John. 2010, "Civil Religion and Associational Life under Canada’s “Ephemeral 
Monster”: Canada’s Multi-Headed Constitution” in Civil Religion in Political, in Civil Religion in Political 
Thought, 298-328. New York, The Catholic University Press of America.
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Civil Religion in Canada
The Canadian situation is more difficult to discern than perhaps it first 
appears. Kim and Bellah have argued at different times that there is no civil religion 
in Canada. Kim argues that there is not, and cannot be a civil religion in Canada 
because the population is too fragmented. This fragmentation comes from 
regionalism, religious and ethnic backgrounds of the citizenry, and other factors that 
all militate against a firm civil religion, unlike the United States.3 Kim does however 
acknowledge, in a footnote, that,
this is not to argue, however, that the concept of civil religion 
necessarily implies that a given state has only one civil religion. Nor is 
it implied here that the lack of civil religion is responsible for disunity 
and vice versa. In light of the fact that many scholars simply assume 
the absence of civil religion in Canada, this article attempts to analyze 
systematically the hindering factors. This essay can also be taken as 
an examination of dual civil religions of Canada; one for Quebec and 
the other for the rest of Canada (Kim 1993, 258).
Bellah also argues that Canada has no civil religion, but for different reasons. He 
argues that Canadians, unlike the citizens of the United States, do not have a 
founding creed which unites them. There is no Canadian version of the ‘American 
Dream.’ Like Kim, Bellah also argues that the existence in Canada of a “large 
province that is linguistically, ethnically, and religiously distinct from the rest of 
Canada” prevents the development of a unifying civil religion (Bellah and Hammond 
1980, xiii).
3 Kim, Andrew. 1993. “The Absence of Pan-Canadian Civil Religion: Plurality, Duality, and 
Conflict in Symbols of Canadian Culture.” Sociology of Religion 54 (3): 257-275
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I counter both Kim and Bellah to argue that there is, and always has been a 
form of civil religion in Canada, even if that form has shifted over time. What is at 
issue is the nature, structure and beliefs of this civil religion. Rather than focus on 
the religious differences between Catholic Quebec and Protestantism found mostly 
in the rest of Canada, it is yet possible to identify many similarities and common 
themes in the ways in which religious belief both animated and influenced civic 
behavior across Canada. I find Protestant civic piety the most relevant to an 
historical Canadian centric discussion on civil religion, although I propose to broaden 
the definition and expand it to Christian civic piety4 in order not to exclude 
Catholicism and more accurately reflect the particular identity of civil religion in 
Canada prior to the 1960s. Admittedly, such a conflation is easier to make in 
hindsight: in the 1950s, the distinction between Protestants and Catholics might 
have seemed much more critical than it does now in the twenty-first century. The 
point, however, is that the country liberally expressed Christian civic piety throughout 
the first century of confederation. It should be noted here that the Christian civic 
piety I am writing about is Durkheimian in nature and originated more from society 
than from the state. The piety was driven by the social norms of society, unlike the 
more Rousseauian type of civil religion that stems more from the state.
The suggestion that Canada lacked a unified civil religion has been a 
recurring problem for scholars trying to identify Canadian culture, or what it means to 
be a ‘Canadian.’ Some identify Canada with subsidized health care and a generally
4 In Canada it was not possible to refer to one single civil religion, even as a protestant civic 
piety. This is due to the continuing Catholic influence both in Quebec and other pockets of the 
country. This is also noted by Kim in his article “The Absence of Pan-Canadian Civil Religion:
Plurality, Duality, and Conflict in Symbols of Canadian Culture.”
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strong social safety net as if federal policy is what defines Canada. Canada clearly 
existed well before the Canada Health Care Act and other elements of the state 
sponsored social safety net. It is important to explore the traditional Christian civic 
piety that was once a part of its identity.
As evidence of the Christian basis of the Canadian identity, as well as the 
widespread foundation of this Christian basis, one can review the work of Preston 
Jones when he writes
when Quebec’s French intellectuals and principal public figures 
wondered what French Canadians were for -  when they wondered 
what the French Canadian’s place in the world was -  they arrived at 
answers quite different from those offered by English-speaking writers 
and speakers. But -  to stick with the simple division -  both sides relied 
on the Bible. Both sides knew they were special -  more special than 
the other. They knew this because the Bible told them so.
English-speaking Canadians and Franco-Canadians were chosen 
peoples. The former were chosen because they were part and parcel 
of the British Empire, which, ‘like the might tree described by the
Prophet,’ had spread godly roots around the globe. The latter were
special because they had picked up where ancient Israel (the chosen 
nation of old) had left off. Protestant Canadians were special, some 
said, because they honored the Sabbath and the family more than any 
other people on earth. French-Canadian Catholics were special 
because Quebec was ‘the instrument chosen by divine Providence to 
evangelize the American continent... (Jones 2010, 285)
In the English Canadian civil religion tradition, the people were not all members of 
the same church or even followed the Christian faith. This is equally true of the 
United States and most other western countries. What is true is that there was a 
tradition which focused on the religious needs of society, and recognition of the need 
to acknowledge and accommodate God in public life. This acknowledgement and
accommodation will be examined more in the next chapter, where it will also be
noted that such behavior reflected recognition by the state of the values of the
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society it governed rather than an imposition by the state on society. Cristi noted 
this distinction in her study of civil religion
...the central focus of Bellah’s thesis is that there is a set of national 
symbols and rituals in America that transcend and effectively neutralize 
differences in beliefs and values of American citizens, irrespective of 
their religions, ethnic backgrounds, or social positions (Cristi 1997, 5).
This was true in Canada as well. One need only look to such things as the motto of 
Canada. In 1867, the Fathers of Confederation accepted the suggestion of Leonard 
Tilley when Canada needed a description or motto. A deeply devout Christian man, 
Tilley was “struck by Psalm 72:8: ‘His dominion shall be also from sea to sea.”' He 
suggested this designation as appropriate, and the other Fathers of Confederation 
agreed. “The Dominion of Canada it would be” (Dictionary of Canadian Biography 
Online 2000), (Moore 1997, 279). Preston Jones notes that “Catholic Quebecers’” 
cultural identity, like Protestants, was shaped by biblical language and themes” 
(Jones 2010, 280-297).
The Confederation of four colonies to create Canada did not directly involve 
churches as such. Congregations as communities seemed ambivalent to overt 
political discussions (Grant 1969). It was mostly politicians who were involved in the 
Confederation project. This is not to say that there were no religious voices calling 
for spiritual unity of the land. George Brown, as editor of the Globe and an early 
proponent of Confederation, looked to the new nation to provide a government that 
would “endeavour to maintain liberty, and justice and Christianity throughout the 
land” (Grant 1969, 330). Brown’s advocacy was reflective of an active religious 
press.
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While supportive of the confederation project overall, there were religious 
reservations about the particulars. One of these reservations surrounded the issue 
of education and the role of religion in the schools. Baptists and Congregationalists 
were unhappy about the provision of denominational schooling being enshrined in 
the British North America Act in 1867, the Act of the British Parliament which 
constituted Canada (Grant 1969, 332). The Baptist and Congregationalist 
viewpoints regarding denominational education were greatly at odds with the 
powerful Roman Catholic and Anglican Church views. The Roman Catholic and 
Anglican churches especially wanted a strong religious component to the 
educational systems, which they definitely wanted to manage if they could not 
outright control.
The churches in English Canada and in Quebec were very influential in the 
country’s functioning after Confederation, especially in the spheres of social services 
and education. Most people were followers of one Christian denomination or 
another, although such affiliation did not always and necessarily translate into high 
levels of church attendance. Quebec was an exception, where the numbers of 
attendees at Catholic Mass were very high, bordering on ninety percent (Noll 2006, 
249). The rationale for such attendance in Quebec was that the church was more 
directly involved in all areas of life for the Quebec people, including schools and 
hospitals. Attendance at church was a logical extension of this involvement. As the 
clergy and active lay people were directly involved in the day to day operation of the 
province of Quebec and the lives of the people, attendance at Church was simply 
another way for the people to show their loyalty to the Church and their community.
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Despite the role of the Catholic Church in Quebec, there was no single, state 
established church throughout the whole of Canada. There were, however, non­
state efforts by churches to assume a national role. With the merger of Methodists 
and a majority of Presbyterians in Canada in 1925, for example, a new “United 
Church” declared its readiness to tackle the moral and spiritual needs of the country. 
As Neil Semple described,
The support for church union was heavily bound up with the optimistic 
vision of Canada itself...If Canada’s destiny was to have a spiritual and 
moral base, a patriotic national church must instill a common set of 
Christian principles, help preserve national and social stability, guide 
the country’s conscience, and make Canada a legitimate model for the 
entire world (Semple 1996, 427).
Even as churches did not have as direct an influence on the political realm in 
Canada as established churches in some countries, overall Christian themes were 
well on display in Canadian politics throughout this first century of Confederation. As 
Noll argues:
the marks of that civilization [Christian Canada] included fruitful 
cooperation between churches and provincial governments in 
organizing education, social services and eventually health care; 
noteworthy syntheses of traditional faith and modern learning that 
avoided the excesses of both secularization and fundamentalism; 
deep interpenetration of religious convictions and social values in the 
outworking of family and community life in many localities; and, not 
least, steady strengthening of the main denominations...(Noll 2006, 
250-251).
The ability of the governments to rely so heavily on the churches for the provision of 
services was because most of the citizens at the time were members of various 
different Christian denominations. In his inaugural 1947 Gray Lecture series, for 
example, Louis St. Laurent noted,
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I am sure, however, that in our national life we are continually 
influenced by the conceptions of good and evil which emerged from 
Hebrew and Greek civilization and which have been transformed and 
transmitted through Christian traditions of the Western World. These 
are values which laid emphasis on the importance of the individual, on 
the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations, on 
standards of judgment which transcend mere material well-being (St. 
Laurent 1947).
Such a speech might have seemed rather innocuous in 1947, but with the 
subsequent rise of the secular state, it is unlikely a speech like this could and would 
be given by someone in Mr. St. Laurent’s position today. At the time, Mr. St. Laurent 
was a senior cabinet minister and he was elected party leader and Prime Minister 
the next year.
Questioning Christian Civic Piety
This prevalence of Christian civic piety -  even in more benign or latent forms - 
remained much the same for most of the first hundred years of Canadian history. I 
will show in the next chapter how Christian civic piety was especially manifest to 
include religious exercises in education across Canadian provinces. My purpose 
here, however, is to underscore that by the 1950s and 1960s the religious landscape 
in Canada began to change. Regarding the late 1950s to early 1960s, George 
Egerton writes in retrospect that “...the former privileged public status and functions 
of religion in Canada have been severely curtailed, as churches have been politically 
marginalized and religious expression privatized in an increasingly secularized 
political culture of pluralism” (Egerton 2004b, 2). Egerton notes that the churches 
were willing to be involved in the new human rights debate following the war, but 
they wanted the debate to have a theological underpinning. This was not always a
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simple proposition, and can be seen in the discussions about the debate regarding 
the adoption of the Canadian Bill of Rights prior to and during the Diefenbaker era. 
The original drafts of the Bill did not include any reference to God or any other deity, 
which was unacceptable to many people, including some influential politicians at the 
time. This led to the inclusion of a reference to God in the Preamble. At the time, it 
was made clear that a Christian reference was unacceptable due to the need to 
recognize the sensitivities of other religions, in this case particularly the Jewish 
community (Egerton 2004b, 2). This view was very actively promoted by politicians 
such as Paul Martin Sr. of the Liberal Party of Canada and other members of the 
House of Commons (Egerton 2004b, 16). Leading Canadian political luminaries 
held out great connections for the religious history of Canada. Some still maintained 
the Christian nation concept even after the start of the recognition to include other 
faith perspectives.
In his Chancellor’s inaugural address at Victoria University, Lester Pearson 
stated "’countries which are the heirs of Christendom” were confronted “both by 
military danger and by the menace of false doctrines’” (Egerton 2004b, 4). In the
debates leading up to the adoption of the Canadian Bill of Rights, much of the
discourse related to Human Rights language had called for. an explicit recognition of
the need for a religious referent in any document (Egerton 2004a). I shall
demonstrate the role of Christian civic piety in Canada as manifested in this debate. 
The role of religion, preferably Christianity, but not necessarily any specific 
denomination, was paramount to reaching an acceptable compromise. As Egerton 
noted, “in this the traditional Canadian constitutional fusion of Christian religion and
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liberal ideology maintained its privileged role in articulating national identity and 
purpose” (Egerton 2004b,.17).
In God and the Canadian Constitution, George Egerton writes
...constitutional debate and decisions, especially the seminally 
important quest to define and constitutionally entrench human rights, 
illuminate most clearly the historic shifting in Canada from a Christian 
to a pluralist jurisprudence and political culture (Egerton 2005,13).
The point in time Egerton writes about above can be seen as the start of the shift 
away from the traditional form of civil religion Canadians had followed up to 
approximately the 1960s. From this point on, there would be a shift towards a more 
secular, or as George Egerton notes above, a pluralist form of worship. Egerton 
recognized that Canada’s civil religion changed from one based on traditional 
Christian religion tenets to a more pluralistic and secular civil religion.
The Emergence of a Democratic Faith
What happened to this overt Christianity in the Canadian polity? Christian civic piety 
is now overshadowed by what Richey and Jones term “democratic faith.” This 
democratic faith relies not on a transcendent piety. Rather, it relies on “the humane 
values and ideals of equality, freedom, and justice without necessary dependence 
on a transcendent deity or a spiritualized nation represent civil religion at its best in 
the American experience” (Jones and Richey 1974, 17). This is also noted by von 
Heyking in his chapter “Civil Religion and Association Life under Canada’s 
“Ephemeral Monster”” in Civil Religion in Political Thought. He notes that “the most 
recent attempts to evoke civil religion are found in the myth that the Charter of
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Rights and Freedoms represents the progressive historical unfolding of human 
potentiality, freedom and equality” (Weed and von Heyking 2010, 299).
Democratic faith as civil religion has as its mainstay a reliance on the goodwill 
of people towards each other, and the goodness of human nature, often driven by 
the ideals of the state. It does not necessarily rely on the presence of a deity to rule 
over the people as required by Rousseau’s civil religion. This distinction invites 
attention to the dichotomy between the Durkheimian and the Rousseauian types of 
civil religion. The Durkheimian civil religion relies on the role of society and the 
social norms of that society to provide for a common civil religion, whereas the 
Rousseauian civil religion relies more on the role and influence of the state to 
determine how people interact with each other. How democratic faith as civil religion 
is exercised in Canada might be much more than mere expression of values and 
ideals. It may also reflect a shift in the relationship between state and society.
As late as the 1950s, the faith of the people was an active consideration in 
public life and in the actions of the state. The role of the churches and the role of 
religion in general were more important to the state than in subsequent periods. In 
the pre-1950s period, the state was very observant of the role society needed to play 
to make the new country a success. One can see this in the role of the churches and 
the provision of public services to the people. Even people who were not members 
of a particular denomination could still receive health care or other social services 
from a religious order.
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From the 1950s through to approximately the early 1980s and the adoption of 
the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, one can see the place of religion 
taking less of a role in the functioning of the country. During these three decades, I 
also show the rise of the welfare state and the diminished role of the churches in the 
provision of the services to society. These services were now to be provided by an 
emerging, all-encompassing state. The new situation, in the case of the United 
Church and other protestant denominations, left “little to offer in the way of specific 
Christian content in the radically transformed conditions of the 1960s, when 
Canadian governments acted far more effectively than the churches in guaranteeing 
personal welfare” (Noll 2006, 267). This period also saw the rise of the civil rights 
movements, and the articulation of human rights principles. Some of the churches 
were involved in this movement, especially the United Church of Canada. This shift 
away from the role of the churches in the everyday life of the people also coincided 
with a shift away from church attendance. This was, as Noll explains, especially true 
for those churches that had forgone their primary role as religious bodies focused on 
spiritual salvation and more concerned with issues of social justice.
In the period from the early 1980s until contemporary times one sees the role 
of religion almost effectively erased from the public square. By the early 1980s, with 
the constitutional debate in full swing, a new era in state-society relations begins. 
The government of the day was interested in the provision of a Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms being adopted along with the constitutional patriation project. There was 
a full scale debate about the need to include a reference to God or a deity in the new 
constitution. In the end, the pro side of the argument won, and a reference to God
was included in the Preamble. In subsequent years, as will be argued later in this 
thesis, the role of religion in the public square was slowly silenced.
Why does civil religion matter, and what is the importance of the concept in 
this context? Civil religion simply put is a measurement of how state, society, and 
the individual all co-exist. If one is to follow a Rousseauian form of civil religion, then 
the direction over society and the individual must come from the sovereign, or the 
state. If, however, one follows a more Durkheimian form of civil religion, it must 
come from society, as the morals of the individual are created from the society. 
Looking at Bellah’s form of civil religion, it is more in line with the Durkheimian form 
of civil religion, except there the individual plays more of a role than in pure 
Durkheimian civil religion.
Civil religion reflects how people and societies live together. It refers to the 
values that are upheld, the traditions, rituals and symbols that are important to 
people and societies. In the traditional, civic piety form of civil religion one sees in 
Canada’s past, Christian values, symbols, creeds, and rituals were omnipresent. In 
the new civil religion of democratic faith, these values, symbols, creeds, and rituals 
largely have been replaced by more humanistic and secular forms of worship.
Explaining the Change in Civil Religion: The Politics of 20 Years (1960-1980)
To explain the change in civil religion in Canada, it is important to look at 
some of the historical factors that led to this change. Here I will look at three of 
these facts. The first factor was the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, which forever 
changed the relationship between the state and the individual, and also the
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relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The second factor I shall 
examine is the role the adoption of a formal multicultural policy played in the change 
to a new civil religion. The third factor is the adoption of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. I will discuss how this has affected the Canadian political 
landscape and how the Charter relates to this thesis.
The Quiet Revolution was in many ways a defining moment in Quebec’s 
history. Prior to the Quiet Revolution, Quebec society was dominated by the 
Catholic Church on social matters. As Axworthy writes,
Quebec had for centuries jealously guarded its prerogatives on 
language, culture, and religion: there has always been Quebec 
nationalism. But, the pre-1960s province of Quebec was characterized 
by a very conservative-almost reactionary-political-economic system, 
a social structure dominated by the Catholic church [sic] and an 
economic structure dominated by an Anglo elite. These together 
produced a passive provincial government. When it came to pushing 
Quebec's interests in the federal union, the Francophone federal 
members of parliament were compliant.
As a result, the national government and the rest of Canada were able 
to substantially ignore the increasing threat to the preservation of 
French culture in Canada. The interests of Canadians in early postwar 
decades was [sic] to promote economic growth and advance the social 
security systems. This was a role the national government undertook, 
with general acquiescence from the provinces. It appeared to be a very 
successful model, in keeping with the original blueprint of 
Confederation (Axworthy 1988,133).
Gerard Pelletier concurs as he writes
Before 1960, our English-speaking compatriots referred to Quebec as 
"the priest-ridden province". While the same label could also have 
been applied to other western provinces whose prime ministers were 
clergymen, there had never been a single priest in the government of 
Quebec. Nevertheless, the Catholic clergy had a tremendous influence 
on the society of Quebec, especially since almost all the French- 
speaking Quebecers were Roman Catholics, 85 percent of them 
practicing. (Only half the English-speaking Quebec residents, on the
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other hand, who made up 15 percent of the total population, were 
Catholics; the other half were Anglicans or Protestants.)
Assisted by lay religious organizations, the Catholic clergy controlled 
education from elementary school to the university level. The same 
religious groups of nuns and monks were dominant in the fields of 
hospital care and youth protection (orphanages, homes for delinquent 
youth), and in the social services. The groups also had a huge real 
estate patrimony and controlled a substantial part of the press. The 
clergy could promote its views in almost all public debates--and could 
silence all those who did not agree. It was hardly an exaggeration to 
say that, at that time, the Catholic clergy was omnipresent and 
omnipotent in Quebec and that no political structure could govern 
without the support of its bishops and clergymen (Pelletier 1988, 266).
According to Axworthy, the new found freedom the French Canadians in Quebec 
found after the start of the Quiet Revolution unleashed a torrent of change in the 
arts, economic development, and education areas of provincial life (Axworthy 1988, 
133). This also created a profound challenge to the established political order in 
Canada. According to Axworthy, there were two movements that arose as a result 
of the Quebec awakening. One promoted outright independence, and others 
promoted a renewed federalism which would provide greater power for Quebec. 
Axworthy quotes Gerard Pelletier, who wrote
Canadian federalism has not failed: the truth is that it has never really 
been tried. Neither by our English-speaking partners who had abused 
their position of strength, nor by ourselves because we had not known 
how to put to work the means we actually possessed (Axworthy 1988,
134).
This period of time also saw the rise of the Quebec politicians on the federal scene, 
particularly Pierre Trudeau. He brought with him the experiences of watching the 
Quiet Revolution and the start of the separatist movement in Quebec. Although a 
Quebecer himself, Trudeau was by no means either a Quebec or Canadian 
extremist. As Powe writes about Trudeau
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For sixteen years a civil war was waged in Canada...The civil war had 
one champion, one general architect: Pierre Elliot Trudeau. His goal: a 
bilingual, cosmopolitan state unified by a central, nationalist idea. His 
war was fought against those who sought to fracture the nation into a 
loose federation; it was waged against the passive and dull, against 
isolationists (Powe 1996, 71).
Trudeau enforced the bilingualism provisions of federal policy by implementing it in 
federal services and over federally regulated business across this country. To his 
credit, Trudeau did this because he felt it was the correct action to save Canada, 
and not because it was popular. As Axworthy notes, it was an unpopular act, 
especially in western Canada, and cost Trudeau’s federal Liberal Party political 
support. The bilingualism policy was also not fully embraced in Quebec, as the 
strong nationalists believed it was not enough, and even the moderate provincial 
Liberal Party pushed for more provincial powers to protect and promote the French 
language (Axworthy 1988,135-136).
It is important to put this change into the context of this thesis. Before the 
start of the Quiet Revolution, Pelletier writes, the Catholic Church controlled the 
school system. However, this had not always been the case. As Graham Spry 
notes, Quebec had state control of education till 1875. Spry writes that the new 
Quebec education ministry was
the first since such a ministry was abolished in 1875 by a conservative 
and clerical-minded government of Quebec and education at all levels 
was left to the administration of the clergy, increasingly subsidized by 
the taxpayers (Spry 1971, 185).
In Chapter Four, two of the exemplar cases deal with Quebec’s decision to 
implement a new Ethics and Religion Course in Quebec schools. S.L vs. 
Commission Scolaire Des Chenes is about Catholic parents seeking an exemption
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for their children, and Loyola High School v. Courschesne deals with a Catholic 
school seeking an exemption from the programme of the Course. Writing in 1971 
about Quebec, Graham Spry noted
...the government's education and social welfare policies, also 
expressed the new attitude of the State to the Church, and of clerical 
or lay Catholic opinion towards the role of the State (Spry 1971, 187).
Prior to the Quiet Revolution, the people of Quebec were more conservative and 
restricted in their personal decision-making when not directly influenced by the 
Catholic Church. Once they saw that it was permissible to live life without seeking 
permission of the Church, they did so. This can be seen in the dramatic decline in 
Church attendance in Quebec after the start of the Quiet Revolution (Noll 2006, 
249).
While the Quiet Revolution was going on in Quebec, the rest of Canada was 
seeing changes as well, including in its demographic construction. At the time of 
Confederation, the majority of the population was derived from British or French 
ancestry (Driedger 2011, 223). This was mainly from immigration but also from the 
children of immigrants. While there had been some changes throughout the years, 
there had been movements to assimilate the new arrivals. For example, Wilson 
notes that there was a “campaign launched in English Canada calling for the 
assimilation of immigrant communities, the inculcation of the ‘highest Anglo-Saxon 
ideals’, and the wiping out of existing pockets of cultural diversity (Wilson 1984, 63). 
Berry also notes that “historically, the multicultural vision has not always been with 
us and is not guaranteed for the future” (Berry 1984, 103).
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While the concern about the effect of immigration from outside the traditional 
pools of immigrants continued, by the 1960s there were voices on the other side of 
the debate making their voices heard. For example, in 1967, Ramsay Cook wrote
perhaps constantly deploring our lack of identity, we should attempt to 
understand and explain the regional, ethnic and class identities that we 
do have. It might just be that it is in these limited identities that 
‘Canadianism’ is to found (Cook 1967, 663).
It is in this period that Pierre Trudeau introduced the official multicultural policy in 
1971. When introducing the policy of multiculturalism, Trudeau stated
A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends 
itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the 
cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help to break 
down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if 
it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded 
on confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this can grow 
respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes 
and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create 
this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based 
on fair play for all (Hebert 1990, 138).
Canada, it should be noted, has always had a multicultural reality in the sense that 
we have always been a nation of immigrants since the original French colonizers 
were greeted by the First Nations. Berry comments that Trudeau’s multicultural 
policy was simply an intersection between policy and reality (Berry 1984, 103).
Before going further, I will provide some explanation as to what actual 
constitutes multiculturalism. This explanation will provide the context as to how this 
multiculturalism policy helped to change the country, and moved Canada from
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having a Christian civic piety form of civil religion to a democratic faith form of civil 
religion.
I will use Keith McLeod’s typology of the principles of multiculturalism to 
explain the policy. The first fundamental principle of multicultural policy is equality of 
status. This means that all groups were to be treated equally, although in a bilingual 
setting, recognizing Canada’s historical reality. The second principle is equally 
important, as the emphasis is on Canadian identity. McLeod argues that the various 
new groupings who found their new status enhanced with the multicultural policy 
were still Canadians, and this contributed to a fundamental part of Canadian identity, 
namely pluralism. The third principle is sharing our culture, which McLeod describes 
as our values, attributes, histories, experiences, and institutions. McLeod’s fourth 
principle is greater choice of lifestyles. This fourth principle means that we are freer 
now to enjoy and be exposed to other cultural realities (McLeod 1984, 30-33).
Of these principles, the one most relevant to this thesis, and which helps to 
explain the change in civil religion is Canadian identity. McLeod writes
“one factor that English Canadians and French Canadians do not 
reflect upon is that many institutions which they have dominated and 
regarded as part of mainstream Canadian life were, and still are very 
exclusive to their groups” (McLeod 1984, 30).
It must be remembered that this was written in 1984, 13 years after the adoption of 
the multicultural policy, but only two years after the adoption of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. It was the Charter that would change the French-English 
exclusivity which McLeod was writing about, and it is the adoption of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in Canada that I shall turn to now.
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In 1976, the separatist Parti Quebecois came to power in Quebec. Toward 
the end of its mandate in 1980 the Parti Quebecois government held a province- 
wide referendum on what they termed sovereignty association with the rest of 
Canada. While this referendum failed, it was a wakeup call for all federal politicians 
in Ottawa. One of the recurring themes used by Prime Minister Trudeau was that he 
would make a new constitutional deal. According to Axworthy, Trudeau’s original 
vision was to patriate the constitution which included an amending formula and 
would add certain language and cultural guarantees (Axworthy 1988, 137).
The constitutional debate in the early 1980s included many groups, not just 
the traditional English-French privileged groups McLeod wrote, about. Axworthy 
captures this new trend very well when he writes
it signified a major broadening of the field of human and civil rights in 
Canada and in this way brought the constitutional, indeed the entire 
political, framework into greater conformity with the far more pluralistic 
and heterogeneous society that Canada has become (Axworthy 1988,
138).
Abu-Laban and Gabriel note that the patriation project and the decision to include a 
Charter brought together many groups to broaden recognition who advocated for the 
inclusion of a multiculturalism reference to recognize the Canadian demographic 
reality (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 110). As Uberoi notes, over 30 percent of the 
Canadian population was from non-United Kingdom or French descent (Uberoi 
2009, 809).
Earlier I wrote that of McLeod’s four-fold typology, I found the Canadian
Identity most relevant. I further support this argument by quoting from a 1971
Liberal Cabinet Document of the Canadian government, which stated
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multiculturalism would be ‘“ a unifying force to build a strong Canadian identity” - 
Cab. Doc. 981-71, 1971 (Uberoi 2009, 809). In 1980, a federal minister stated the 
following to the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism
this new Constitution will be written for Canadians and it must faithfully 
reflect the reality of Canada today. Since this country is bilingual and 
multicultural, the Constitution will recognise this fact without ambiguity.
I can tell you without hesitation that the government itself has 
absolutely no objection to inserting the word ‘multiculturalism’ in the 
text of the Constitution, although the bill on the text of the Constitution, 
which was made public last June, already does take into account the 
realities of Canada’s diverse nature (Uberoi 2009, 811).
Uberoi argues that there were three main factors that led to the federal government’s 
agreement to include multiculturalism in the constitution. The first factor was the 
growing acceptance of the new reality by the political elite; the second was the 
growing ethnic influence in Canada as from non-United Kingdom and French 
descent reached approximately 30 percent of the population; lastly, the actual 
acceptance of the federal government itself that there was a new multicultural reality 
in Canada (Uberoi 2009, 811). Thus we see that the inclusion of the multicultural 
fact in the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms was merely recognition on the part of the 
political elite in Canada and the rising power of the non-traditional elements of 
Canadian society. There is, however, another element to the Charter that is 
important to this thesis, namely the newfound power of the courts.
A concern about the adoption of the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms was that 
it would lead to “excessive emphasis on our rights against the state [and] might 
undermine fulfillment of our responsibilities to each other and thus undermine our 
communal well-being” (Weinrib 2007, 401). While Weinrib focusses on Justice
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lacobucci in her article, this could equally be written about anyone thinking about the 
Charter. Weinrib goes on to write
Instead, his [Justice lacobucci ] judgments demonstrate that he came 
to the understanding that the Charter not only mandates reconstruction 
of the very social arrangements and institutions of government that be 
bad instinctively sought to insulate from change but also contains a 
transformative dynamic that introduces or intensifies the application of 
principles that be fully endorsed. The Charter, so conceived, supports 
the flourishing of all members of Canadian society, as free and equal 
individuals, within a revised configuration of the social, communal, and 
political spheres of life (Weinrib 2007, 402).
Smithey (Smithey 2001, 85-107), notes that while there are no “explicit textual limits’’ 
to the promotion of religion by government in the constitution, the courts have indeed 
limited this right.
The newfound power on the part of the courts is not without its critics, 
however. Smithey notes that “many of the critics focus on the negative results of 
transferring ‘political power from more accountable democratic institutions to 
relatively unaccountable judicial and quasi-judicial agencies” (Smithey 2001, 86).
For the purposes of this thesis, Gidney and Millar are most instructive. They 
write about the situation in Ontario and the removal of religious exercises and 
education there. They wrote
What resolved the issue was not a uniformly secularized public opinion 
increasingly indifferent to the traditional role of Christianity in the 
schools. Opinion indeed was deeply divided. Substantial numbers of 
those who supported Ontario’s public schools continued to form their 
vision of the good school within a Christian context. Others, though 
less committed to that view, were reluctant to sunder public education 
entirely from the outward symbols of the faith. What really pried the lid 
open was the passage, by the federal Parliament [and provincial 
parliaments except Quebec], of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
41
Freedoms, and two crucial court cases that followed from it (Gidney 
and Millar 2001, 288).
At the outset of this section, I outlined three major factors that have led to change in 
Canada: from a Christian civic piety form of civil religion to one founded on 
democratic faith. The Quiet Revolution forever changed the way in which 
Quebecers interacted with the provincial state, but also how Quebec interacted with 
the rest of Canada. It setup the secularization trend that has continued to this day, 
which can be seen in the case of Loyola High School v. Courschesne. Indeed, in 
that case, the trial judge specifically referred to the new Ethics and Religion course 
being implemented as part of the secularization trend within educational programs in 
Quebec (Quebec Superior Court 2010, pp. 47-48).
The multicultural policy adopted by the Trudeau government was another 
major factor in the change at that time, which led to the type of democratic faith civil 
religion that is currently observed within Canada. This policy recognized that 
Canada was no longer a bilingual and bi-cultural country, but instead consisted of 
many peoples, including First Nations, but also other immigrant groups alongside the 
long entitled French and English peoples. This policy was difficult for some to 
accept, particularly in Quebec because for some this meant they were losing some 
of their special place in the country.
The Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms was another factor that 
changed the way Canada functioned and how Canadians related to each other. The 
Charter was instrumental in empowering previously less powerful groups as the
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courts in Canada became more involved in interpreting the Charter along 
multicultural and individual rights perspectives.
Why does this shift matter?
The role of religion and the churches has now been replaced, some argue,
with the courts as the “conscience of the nation” (Weed and von Heyking 2010, 300). 
As Jeffrey Simpson stated, “The Charter o f Rights and Freedoms is the closest thing 
Canadians have to a canon these days with the Supreme Court justices as legal 
cardinals” (Simpson March 31, 2000, A15). These ideas may seem foreign to some 
Canadians, but it seems to be the accepted wisdom that once the Supreme Court 
has ruled on an issue, the ruling is to be accepted, even if people disagree with the 
outcome. This is sovereignty of the courts, not of the people or their Parliament, 
where the courts are supreme. Chief Justice McLachlin calls the ideals and 
principles found in the Charter, Canada’s ‘hypergoods’ (McLachlin 2004, 12-34). As 
the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of these ‘hypergoods,’ Canadians see the 
sovereignty of the people’s parliament overshadowed by an organ of the state.
Von Heyking argues that the courts in Canada have redefined what it means 
to be tolerant, and that this is the beginning of the court’s involvement with the 
Charter. The Charter has its own explicitly laid out statements of protection, but the 
courts have expanded on this over time to include other interpretations. For 
example, the religious organizations in Canada are free to practice their beliefs as 
long as they do no ‘harm’ to others. Religious groups should be free to practice their 
religion as long as no one can show harm to themselves as a result of this practice.
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Lately, this ‘harm’ has come to include not having one’s identity recognized by these 
religious organizations (Weed and von Heyking 2010, 303).
Here arises a difficulty for society. In order to successfully accomplish 
change in the way values are adopted and maintained, von Heyking argues, the 
state must “change the beliefs and customs of its citizens, and so requires an 
expansive state taking a paternal or maternal tutelary role over its citizens in 
protecting them” (Weed and von Heyking 2010, 303). I will show this is the goal of 
the state in the provision of education. According to my research, this tutelary role 
has been a primary goal of educators since before Confederation. The difference is 
the basis of this education. As mentioned earlier, the role of the civil religion in a 
Durkheimian context is to draw the social norms and values from society, whereas 
the Rousseauian civil religion of democratic faith has more influence from the state 
over the society.
The idea that the origins of values will change, as von Heyking argues, is why 
the concept of civil religion is important to understanding state-society relations. In 
Rousseau’s universe, the people must be conditioned to accept a new way of 
thinking that will right historical wrongs and promote a new and tolerant society. The 
more people come to rely on this new civil religion to replace the old religions, the 
more powerful the state must become to ‘protect’ individuals, not only from others 
but also from themselves. This is what I shall turn to now.
At the beginning of this chapter, I identified Christian civic piety as Canada’s 
early civil religion. Christian civic piety was woven from two threads: one mostly
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found in French, Catholic Quebec, and one in the rest of the mainly English 
speaking, mostly Protestant Canada. With the emergence of democratic faith, an 
attempt is being made to construct a pan-Canadian civil religion that unites the entire 
country under one dominant belief. Von Heyking argues that this pan-Canadian civil 
religion is to be fully secular and a complete vision of Canadian citizenship (Weed 
and von Heyking 2010, 305). It is therefore quite logical to expect some tensions 
and conflict between these two creeds to emerge.
The work of Alexis de Tocqueville can illuminate the relevance of these 
tensions and conflict. Using Tocqueville’s argument one can “show Canadians how 
the logic of equality can become a statist “democratic faith” hostile to other forms of 
faith” (Weed and von Heyking 2010, 303). This “democratic faith” can become 
dangerous because it can crowd out other legitimate beliefs of society. This can 
result in a situation where individuals are expected to embrace all that the state 
professes, with little room left for public discussion or displays of other beliefs. The 
other beliefs most likely to suffer would be the religious beliefs of the people. This 
will be shown more clearly in Chapter Four where I examine conflicts between 
Christian civic piety and democratic faith.
This thesis does not argue that the role of the state should not be used to 
promote worthwhile goals. The danger is in determining who decides what these 
worthwhile goals are. Tocqueville was clear that an overzealous passion for equality 
would invite risk to the principles of liberty. The requirements of equality, particularly 
as they are commonly articulated through the language of rights, invite the state to 
play an ever increasing role. As von Heyking argues, “conflicted between his belief
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in his own independence and his perception of his powerlessness, the democrat 
slouches toward the “immense being” that is the tutelary state” (Weed and von 
Heyking, 2010).
Tocqueville, of course, was a friendly critic of democracy. As such, 
Tocqueville wanted to promote the concept of democracy but also warn people to 
keep their minds open to the dangers of this style of government. Tocqueville 
argues that religious bodies are well suited to promote democracy but also to keep it 
‘in line.’ People would benefit from memberships in religious organizations in order 
to prepare them for membership in the wider society.
Tocqueville wrote,
When religion is destroyed in a people, doubt takes hold of the highest 
portions of the intellect and half paralyzes all the others. Each 
becomes accustomed to having only confused and changing notions 
about matters that most interest those like him and himself; one 
defends one’s opinions badly or abandons them, and as one despairs 
of being able to resolve by oneself the greatest problems that human 
destiny presents, one is reduced, like a coward, to not thinking about 
them at all.
Such a state cannot fail to enervate souls; it slackens the springs of the 
will and prepares citizens for servitude (de Tocqueville, Mansfield, and 
Winthrop 2000, 418).
Tocqueville suggested that the pursuit of equality can lead a people to lose their 
freedom and their capacity for self-government. This concern is demonstrated as 
society has diminished influence over important public policy, such as education. In 
Canada one can see some of this where the courts have taken an active role in 
defining what McLachlin defines as 'hypergoods,’ without direct input of the people.
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We have now seen that the concept of a civil religion in Canada is contested 
by the likes of Bellah and Kim. I have attempted to demonstrate, however, that there 
is an always has been a form of civil religion in Canada. It is only the type of civil 
religion that has changed. The original, Durkheimian form of civil religion form of 
Christian civic piety has changed to become a more Rousseauian form of civil 
religion, namely democratic faith. The decline of religious influence in Canadian 
society has been accompanied, or perhaps caused by an increase in the level of 
state involvement in society.
In Chapter Three, I will examine the role of education and how it was 
intertwined with the original form of civil religion, namely Christian civic piety. This is 
important as I shall show how all-encompassing the metamorphosis from Christian 
civic piety to democratic faith is manifested when I examine the education exemplars 
in Chapter Four.
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Chapter Three: Education and Christian Civic Piety
In the previous two chapters I have studied the concept of civil religion and 
identified the dominant characteristics of Canadian civil religion. In this chapter, I 
turn towards the role of religion in public education, first as a manifestation of 
Christian civic piety, and then (later) as an avenue to explore the emergence of 
democratic faith as a new civil religion in Canada. I first examine the work of 
Egerton Ryerson, the first superintendent of schools for Upper Canada (Ontario) in 
the 1840s. This might seem like an unnecessary digression, but Egerton Ryerson’s 
work is relevant to education across Canada. As Child notes, “immigrants from 
Ontario, especially those who had attended normal school and taught in the 
province, had been strongly influenced by the Ryerson tradition” (Child 1978, 279). 
This tradition, which placed a premium on Christian civic piety, dominated Canadian 
schools until the mid-twentieth century. In the latter decades of the twentieth 
century, Christian civic piety was overshadowed in the public schools by democratic 
faith. How this change came about can inform our understanding of the dynamics of 
civil religion in Canada, and is examined more carefully in Chapter Four.
Prior to his taking on the role of Superintendent of Education for Upper 
Canada in a formal capacity, Egerton Ryerson conducted tours of Europe and the 
United States to come up with ideas on how best to structure an effective school 
system. As a consequence of his tours, he became convinced that the need for 
moral instruction of students was as crucial as any other type of learning. Moral 
instruction thus became an important educational objective of the school system he
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devised (Cragg 1979, 28). In his Report on a System of Public Elementary 
Instruction for Upper Canada, Ryerson spends considerable time on this topic.
Ryerson was adamant that an effective school system would be based on the 
principles of Christianity, and thus unite the combined influence and support of the 
Government and the people (Ryerson 1847, 9). Ryerson believed that education 
should be provided to all children not just the children of the rich. This would prevent 
‘pauperism,’ and all the evils that came with it. This would also strengthen the 
Christian foundations of society. Indeed, Ryerson believed that it was crucial to 
have state funded schools for all children as the poor could not afford to educate 
their children. In his report, he notes “it is the poor indeed that need the assistance 
of the Government, and they are the proper objects of its special solicitude and care; 
the rich can take care of themselves” (Ryerson 1847, 20). This expression of 
Christian charity was a hallmark of Ryerson’s life and his work on the school system.
It was Christianity Ryerson was speaking of when he used the term religion. 
What he was most careful to pronounce against, however, was any type of 
sectarianism in the school system. He believed that it was possible to create a 
school system that promoted a general form of Christianity that would not break 
down the Christian community into sectarian components. He believed that it was 
necessary to promote this type of moral education to promote the secure future of 
the country.
When discussing the need for moral and religious education, Ryerson was 
convinced that this could, in fact, be done without the problems caused by religious
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sectarianism. Ryerson believed that “to teach a child the dogmas and spirit of a 
sect, before he is taught the essential principles of religion and morality, is to invert 
the pyramid” (Ryerson 1847, 23). Ryerson believed that it was “possible to teach a 
child the entire history of the Bible, its institutions, cardinal doctrines and morals 
together with the evidences of its authenticity” (Ryerson 1847, 23-24). He did not 
believe this could be done in the constraints of the elementary system however, no 
matter how desirable this might be.
The state of the schools in Upper Canada was also a concern for Ryerson 
when he wrote his report. He lamented that morality and religion, specifically 
Christianity, were ignored to a large extent in the schools. He wrote, “such an abuse 
of that which should be the primary element of education, without which there can be 
no Christian Education; and without a Christian education, there will not long be a 
Christian country” (Ryerson 1847, 31). He was concerned about the lack of 
Christian educators and the lack of Christian content in the schools at this time.
Ryerson quoted at length from a number of education reformers outside of 
Canada. A few will suffice to demonstrate how he was influenced by these people. 
He quotes Thomas Wyse, Esq. as lamenting the lack of moral education in the 
United Kingdom. Wyse writes that it is not sufficient to simply impart ‘knowledge’ as 
this will not allow the children to grow up to be complete citizens. Wyse writes, 
“When I speak of moral education, I imply religion; and when I speak of religion, I 
speak of Christianity” (Ryerson 1847, 33). Ryerson also relied on the work of one 
Dr. Fellenberg who set up numerous schools in Europe to educate the children of 
people from various countries. Fellenberg wrote that
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I call that education which embraces the culture of the whole man, -- 
with all his faculties, -- subjecting his senses, his understanding, and 
his passions to reason, to conscience and to the evangelical laws of 
Christian Revelation (Ryerson 1847, 32).
Professor Stowe was tasked to complete a similar study to Ryerson’s for the State of
Ohio. He wrote that in his discussions with various educators in Europe, he was
constantly reminded that “to leave the moral faculty uninstructed was to leave the
most important part of the human mind undeveloped” (Ryerson 1847, 37). This
again was to be done in a non-sectarian manner, as Ryerson makes clear. The
Prussian school system promoted and taught the Bible at great length, it was done
using common Christian ideals. As Ryerson writes, “so far as Bible lessons are
concerned, I can ratify the strong statements made by Professor Stowe, in regard to
the absence of sectarian instruction or endeavors at proselytism” (Ryerson 1847,
38). Ryerson also quoted approvingly of the General Law of Prussia about the state
of education and what is expected of it. He wrote:
The chief mission of every school is to train the youth in such a manner 
as to provide in them, with the knowledge of man’s relations to God, 
the strength and desire to regulate his life according to the principles 
and spirit of Christianity (Ryerson 1847, 47).
As for Upper Canada, Ryerson stressed that it was the duty of the state to reflect the 
makeup of its people. It should be recognized that while there were non-Christians 
living in Canada at the time, these were not taken into account as the overwhelming 
majority of the population were Christians. Ryerson writes that “[a] Government that 
practically renounces Christianity in providing for the education of its youthful 
population, cannot be Christian” (Ryerson 1847, 50).
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Ryerson noted that it was important for the Government of Canada to 
recognize that Canada was a Christian country with a Christian creed and that this 
obliged the government to be supportive of the morals and religion of the people 
(Ryerson 1847, 50). According to Ryerson, the government could and should 
provide the facilities for educating the different groups of Christians. This did not 
mean that the government should build churches, but that society should be allowed 
to use government schools to teach its children. This was to be reflected in later 
school acts. The use of the Bible as a core teaching device was to be promoted 
most fully, but only in a way that did not divide the people (Ryerson 1847, 61).
After Ryerson took on the job of Superintendent of Education for Upper 
Canada, he went about the task of setting up the school system he envisioned in his 
report of 1847. His first attempt was a disaster as it was taken over by political 
events. Consistent conflict between politicians from Upper and Lower Canada about 
the educational issues and the rights of the minorities threatened to overshadow 
Ryerson’s vision of how a truly modern educational system should function. The 
original education bill of 1849 was so flawed in its final version that Ryerson even 
threatened to resign if it was enacted. Taking his threat seriously, the government of 
Upper Canada did not enact the bill, and Ryerson came back with a new bill in 1850 
which was passed. The bill included the provisions for religious education that had 
been in the system four years earlier in the School Act of 1846. These provisions 
included, but were not limited to, the exclusion of children from religious study where 
parents objected to the information being imparted. Also included in the School Act 
of 1850 was section 14, which stated, among other religious education standards,
that “...provided always, that within this limitation, pupils shall be allowed to receive 
such religious instruction as their parents and guardians shall desire, according to 
the general regulations which shall be provided according to law” (High Court of 
Justice, Divisional Court 1988, pp 88). Here it becomes clear to see that the 
religious education or exercises were to be determined by the parents of the pupils. 
Thus it can be seen that the foundation of religious education was connected to 
society and social norms, rather than the state.
It is also clear from a 1917 article that religious exercises were very common 
and widespread in the Ontario Public schools (Sheridan Feb/Dec 1917). In the 
Ontario government education report published previous to Sheridan’s 1917 article, 
the Ontario government report stated that “45.87% of the schools used the 
authorized Scripture selections, 70.94% used the Bible and 94.61% were opened 
and closed with prayer” (Sheridan Feb/Dec 1917, 17). Ryerson’s concerns over 
sectarian conflict in the schools were manifest by local tensions over the 
interpretation of scripture. Accordingly, to avoid the problems of sectarianism or 
schism, the readings were completed without comment on the part of the teacher 
(Sheridan Feb/Dec 1917, 17).5 A series of books about Biblical stories had recently 
been made available to the schools, and just before Sheridan’s article was 
published, books about the “Golden Rule” had been introduced to the schools 
(Sheridan Feb/Dec 1917, 18).
5 This is very similar to the requirement of the Ethics and Religious Culture course in Quebec 
which will be examined later in Chapter Four.
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According to Sheridan, it was no accident or force of the government which 
imposed these rules on the people. The people wanted these rules in place to 
promote their religion. As Sheridan notes,
the people of the province [Ontario] have made it evident that they wish that 
the spirit of the schools should be religious, and the government [Ontario 
provincial government] has made provision for the full expression of the will of 
the people (Sheridan Feb/Dec 1917,19).
In 1924, section 13 of the General Regulations, Public and Separate Schools was 
announced. Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the regulations instructed schools boards to allow 
their buildings to be used for religious education. Such instruction, taught by clergy, 
would be either before or after the regular school day. This regulation regarding 
religious instruction was different than religious exercises, which were to be 
conducted as part of the opening and closing procedures of the school as found in 
Section 13(1). These religious exercises were to be conducted with an opt out 
clause however, to make sure that no student was forced to participate if they (being 
of legal age) or their parents objected as cited in the Elgin County judicial decision 
(High Court of Justice, Divisional Court 1988, pp 41-42).
The post war years brought changes to this setup. As Sweet notes,
Both World Wars bolstered the impetus for religious education. People 
were appalled at the devastation wreaked by them. In fact, during the 
Second World War, there was a sense that instilling a moral purpose in 
the young was the only way to ensure a future. So, in 1944, a 
regulation was changed to make religious instruction part of the regular 
curriculum (Sweet 1997, 31).
In the new regulations, instead of clergy being allowed to come in and teach the 
students before or after school hours, teachers were to give two half periods of
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religious education per week. Instead of teachers being the instructors, boards had 
the option of using local clergy instead (Hope Commission 1950, 124). This was a 
major change to the way religion was taught in the public schools. Now it was part 
of the regular curriculum, and of course the religious instruction was non-sectarian, 
yet Christian education.
The Programme of Studies for Grades I to VI of the Public and Separate 
Schools 1941, explicitly stated: “The schools of Ontario exist for the purpose of 
preparing children to live in a democratic society which bases its way of life upon the 
Christian ideal” (Hope Commission 1950,124). The Hope Commission further noted 
that the Programme of Studies for Grades VII and VIII o f the Public and Separate 
Schools (1942),
contains the view that the social purposes of the school ‘imply the 
existence of standards of behaviour, generally agreed upon and 
accepted by all, to which the conduct of the individual may be referred.
Such standards do in fact exist; and in our society, they derive from the 
ethics of Christian religion and the principles of democratic living (Hope 
Commission 1950, 124).
Here the standards of Canadian society are viewed as a combination of Christianity 
and democratic living. Christian civic piety was strongly represented in the public 
schools as a reflection of social values.
As noted earlier, in 1944 the regulations changed to include religious 
education in Ontario elementary schools, not just religious exercises. The 
regulations brought into force in September 1944 were clear and unambiguous. 
This is not to say that there were no guidelines on how the new regulations were to 
be implemented. As the Hope Commission reported, “the programme of studies in
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religious education for public elementary schools will be non-sectarian and 
undenominational" (Hope Commission 1950, 124). Specifically the Hope 
Commission noted that the regulation says the “Instruction in Religious Education 
shall be given by the teacher in accordance with the course of study authorized for 
that purpose by the Department, and issues of a controversial or sectarian nature 
shall be avoided” (Hope Commission 1950, 124). The standard exemption clause 
for any non-participating student was included in the new regulations as it had been 
since the introduction of the teaching of religious exercises. This time the teachers 
were also included in the exemption clause and other suitable arrangements would 
be found where teachers were unable or unwilling to provide the religious education 
component as required in the new regulations.
In cases where teachers were unsuitable for the provision of the religious 
education due to exemption, the local School Board had the option of invoking 
section 2(d) of the regulation, which read, “By resolution of the School Board, a 
clergyman or clergymen of any denomination or a lay person or lay persons selected 
by the clergyman or clergymen, shall have the right, subject to the regulations, to 
give Religious Instruction, in lieu of a teacher or teachers” (Hope Commission 1950, 
125). Although there was general acceptance of the new regulations, there were 
already early objections from some quarters about the mixing of Church and state 
relations (Hope Commission 1950, 126). The Hope Commission was not deterred in 
its report. It recommended that religious exercises start and end each school day, 
and that religious instruction twice per week be continued in the public elementary 
schools. In fact the Commission went further and recommended that religious
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education be expanded into the secondary schools and junior colleges as well. In 
the interests of non-denominationalism, it was recommended that no religious 
emblems of a denominational nature be allowed in the classrooms of public schools, 
either secondary or elementary. The only exception was to be in rooms used for 
clergy to teach their respective denominational students, and then only while those 
classes were in session.
On the matter of Contribution of School Subjects, the Hope Commission 
wrote about religious education. Specifically, the Commission noted that
The moral and spiritual lessons of the Scriptures should deeply 
influence the conduct and behaviour of children in their daily lives. But 
their effect will be lost unless their applications to daily life are skillfully 
and effectively made, with full sincerity and faith on the part of the 
instructor. As in no other subject, the emphasis in teaching can be 
placed upon conscience, service to others, and responsibility (Hope 
Commission 1950, 166).
As the Hope Commission demonstrated, evidence for the prominence of Christian 
civic piety was abundant in the 1950s in Ontario.
The Christian civic piety expressed in Ontario public schools was by no 
means limited to one province. Across the country, but especially in the West, one 
can see the influence of Ontario and its social structures. The need to educate 
children in the general population was a movement that grew throughout Canada. 
The poor may have been unable to afford to educate their own children, but society 
generally felt a desire for all children to receive an education so as to make of them 
better citizens (Axelrod 1997, 27-28). Paying for the education of the poor was a 
contentious issue for some people. In response to one commentator who did not
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want to pay for the ‘brats’ to be educated, Edgerton Ryerson had once replied “that 
educating ‘brats’ was the very purpose of his free school legislation. ‘It proposed to 
compel selfish, rich men to do what they ought to do, but which they will not do 
voluntarily” (Axelrod 1997, 29).
C.E. Phillips outlines four stages of school development in Canada. While 
these four stages were the same across the country, they took place at different 
times in different geographical locations. The first stage is the infancy stage, where 
schools of all sorts are found. These were as a rule not funded or controlled by the 
state, but mainly churches and philanthropy or the rich for their own children (Phillips 
1957, 179). The second stage was marked by strong government involvement in 
setting up and controlling the schools. The third stage ‘had the characteristics of 
organized efficiency, such as provincial departments of education, etc. The fourth 
stage built on the third stage, but there was more centralized provincial government 
control over the school system. The other difference between the third and fourth 
stage was that attendance was required as schools were setup by the provincial 
authorities (Phillips 1957, 181-181).
As Titley and Miller note, one major factor in the growth in what was to 
become western Canada came from Ontario. Most of these immigrants were 
Anglophone Protestants, and the francophone population found in the West was 
soon outnumbered. The Anglophones were thus able to set up the new territory and 
then provinces in the format they were accustomed to, and “predictably enough, the 
institutional framework would be modelled closely on the familiar -  Ontario” (Titley 
and Miller 1982,18).
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Anglophone protestants in Ontario saw themselves as true Canadians and 
wanted their influence felt as the country expanded. Titley and Miller write that “the 
English-Protestant dimensions of Canadian nationalism were most pronounced in 
Ontario. Ontarians viewed themselves as the real Canadians and looked on the 
West as their natural Lebensraum” (Titley and Miller 1982, 19). As far as education 
went, the 1870s saw a well-established school system. “This system was non­
sectarian [except for the Catholic Schools], publicly supported and imposed with 
compulsory attendance laws and was an intrinsic part of the social fabric” (Titley and 
Miller 1982, 18-19). The Ontario school system was the model for the western 
schools, not only in form, but also in purpose. The Chief Executive of the Northwest 
Administration, Frederick Haultain, believed that the schools were there to assimilate 
all the non-Anglophone immigrants [prior to the establishment of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan] (Titley and Miller 1982, 21). The establishment of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan did provide for some separate minority education rights that exist to 
this day.
Despite this influence, the situation in British Columbia was somewhat 
different found in Ontario and the rest of the country. The successive British 
Columbian governments in the post confederation era maintained a purely secular 
education system, without religious education or exercises. In fact, British Columbia 
was the only province which did not provide for the use of bible readings in the 
schools (BC Civil Liberties Association 1969). This principle was deeply imbedded 
in the provincial education system as late as the 1930s. It was this secular 
educational system that inhibited the expansion of BC’s borders: there was a
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movement by BC Premier Duff Patullo to annex the Yukon Territory and make it a 
part of British Columbia. According to Coates and Morrison, the primary reason this 
expansion did not come to fruition is that there was a Catholic School in the Yukon 
which British Columbian politicians did not want to accept. The federal government, 
remembering the political controversy over past school questions, did not support 
the annexation and quietly let the proposal die (Coates and Morrison 2005, 215- 
216).
Within a few short years however, the question of religion in the schools 
would be raised by parents in British Columbia. By the 1940s, parents were 
successful in getting religious exercises included in the school day. This was in 
response to the perceived need for moral instruction in the school system. In the 
1940s, parents pressed to have religious exercises, but not religious education 
observed in British Columbia schools. As a result, “all schools, however, are to open 
with scripture reading and the Lord’s prayer; “...otherwise the schools shall be 
conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian principles. The highest morality 
shall be inculcated but no religious dogma or creed shall be taught” (Lupul 1967, 
157-158). Thus one can see that even in a province that originally endeavored to 
separate religious instruction from public education, Christian civic piety emerged 
from the dominant social values prevalent in Canadian society.
Quebec was also an outlier to the system established in the rest of the 
country, but for different reasons than in British Columbia. In Quebec, the 
educational system, and indeed most social services were the domain of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The people were beholden to the church for all types of services,
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from social welfare to education to healthcare. As Titley and Miller note, “[The 
Roman Catholic Church] attempted to create a similar network [social network as 
offered in France], of operations in New France, with the same purpose in mind. It 
aimed to reproduce in the colony the social relations and cultural patterns that 
prevailed in France” (Titley and Miller 1982,12).
From the time of colonization to well past confederation, the Catholic Church 
continued to dominate Quebec society. They provided the social services usually 
provided by other means in the other colonies, whether by governments or other 
non-governmental actors. While most of the education was reserved for the elite in 
the French section of the country, there were some religious orders that provided 
educational (mainly vocational training) to the poor, and where there was one, the 
middle class. This control over education continued until the Quiet Revolution in the 
1960s overtook Quebec. Unlike other provinces, Quebec had never bothered to 
establish a government structure to look after education. This was the domain of the 
Church. But this changed with the Quiet Revolution. In 1964 the Quebec 
government established the first Ministry of Education (Titley and Miller 1982, 53). 
This ministry was tasked with holding the real power over education in Quebec, 
although it was still delivered in a denominational setting. The Protestant and 
Catholic committees of the Council of Public Instruction were relegated to 
supervising religious matters instead of all educational issues (Titley and Miller 1982,
53).
As the Roman Catholic Church lost its influence over the people, issues such 
as language became much more powerful. Successive Quebec governments
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brought in legislation to enhance the use of the French language and limit who could 
attend English Schools (Titley and Miller 1982, 53-54).
They note that “the educational changes of the 1970s, then, were of a 
different nature. During that decade the school came to be seen not so much as an 
instrument of modernization, but one of cultural protection” (Titley and Miller 1982,
54). This movement has continued in Quebec, and in the two cases to be discussed, 
in Chapter Four that the schools are now being used to manage the culture 
movement in Quebec by influencing the religious rights of parents and Institutions.
Thus it can been seen that throughout the first hundred years of 
Confederation, public schools in Canada largely embraced Christian civic piety. 
Both in terms of religious exercises and instruction, public schools reflected social 
norms and attempted to foster the moral values of society. Even in the province of 
British Columbia, where a secular school system emerged, societal pressures to 
encourage Christian civic piety overshadowed the exception. Earlier, I identified this 
type of civil religion that is driven by society as Durkheimian. I shall demonstrate in 
the next chapter that not only has this civil religion been eclipsed by a new 
democratic faith, but that this eclipse has occurred through a stronger reliance on 
the state.
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Chapter Four: Public Education and Democratic Faith
This chapter examines the emergence of a Rousseauian civil religion by 
focusing on religious curriculum and practice in education. It is at this intersection 
that I demonstrate the decline of Christian civic piety and its replacement by 
democratic faith. I examine six judicial rulings: three from Ontario, one from British 
Columbia, and two from the province of Quebec. The first of the Ontario cases is 
Zylberberg (1988), which dealt with the issue of prayers in the public schools in 
Ontario. Some parents objected to the established practice and ultimately were 
successful in having the courts remove prayers from public schools. The second 
case is Elgin County also in 1988. This case centred on the issue of religious 
education as mandated by provincial government regulations. The third Ontario 
case is Adler in 1996, which dealt with the issue of funding for non-Catholic religious 
schools in Ontario. Parents of non-Catholic children demanded funding for non- 
Catholic schools on par with the Catholic system. In this case the courts rejected the 
arguments for equal treatment. The Russow case was similar to the Zylberberg 
case. This case was decided in 1989 and it centred on the attempt to remove 
Christian religious exercises from British Columbia schools. As in the Zylberberg 
case, individual parents were successful in petitioning the state to remove Christian 
religious exercises from the schools.
The two Quebec cases are connected by a common thread linked to 
provincial public policy. In 2012, the case of S.L. v. Commission Scolaire des 
Chenes in Quebec followed the provincial government’s decision to introduce a new
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“Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC) course. Some parents argued that this course 
was not religiously neutral, and believed the course was in conflict with the Christian, 
Roman Catholic values that the parents were attempting to instill in their children. 
The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was unsuccessful. The second 
Quebec case was brought by the Principal and the Board of Governors of the private 
Loyola High School in Montreal in Loyola vs. Courschesne. The Principal and Board 
of Governors were similarly displeased with the introduction of the “Ethics and 
Religious Culture” course as they felt that it would be an intrusion on their autonomy 
over religious education provision. They felt that the course was not a neutral 
course and would conflict with the Roman Catholic values they were attempting to 
instill in their students.
These cases reflect tensions between Christian civic piety and the 
introduction of Canada’s new democratic faith. The first four cases demonstrate the 
severing of previously established civil religious values from the Canadian education 
system. The two Quebec cases reflect the assertion of the democratic faith rather 
than the erosion of Christian civic piety. I use these court cases as exemplars to 
show that civil religion has changed from a Christian basis to one based on 
principles of a democratic faith. These principles are centred on human rights rather 
than religious principles as they are commonly understood.
As I wrote in in Chapter Three, the Hope Commission made explicit reference 
to Christian values and the use of scripture in the public school curriculum. This 
declaration notwithstanding, controversy about religious education and exercises 
continued. In order to understand the full impact of the court cases that follow, it is
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prudent to recognize the enduring disagreement about religious education in the 
public schools. In 1966, for example, the Ontario government established the 
Commission on Religious Education in the Public Schools of the Province of Ontario. 
The Commission looked at all aspects of religious exercises and education in 
Ontario at the time. The Commission found that “the present course of study in 
religious education in elementary schools should be discontinued, and that the aims 
as set out in the related legislation, programs of studies, regulations and 
guidebooks, should be abandoned” (MacKay Commission 1969, 27). The 
Commission believed that instead of providing children with only one view of religion, 
it was important for them to learn about world religions as a whole. While the 
difference might seem to be benign, the shift reflected a development away from 
religion as non-sectarian, moral instruction and towards a distanced, objective 
review of different creeds. As was later noted by the Divisional Court in the Elgin 
County case, the report of the Mackay Commission was not acted on by the 
government and the existing regulations stayed in place.
The 1982 enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
ushered in a new era of challenges for religious education. The Charter’s inclusion 
of religious and equality guarantees would sound the death knell of religious 
education in Ontario and in many ways was the culmination of the socio-political 
change underway since the 1960s. As Gidney and Millar wrote
the centrality of Christian doctrine in Ontario’s public schools, albeit in 
a nondenominational Protestant form, was alive and well in the mid- 
twentieth-century; still alive, though less well, as late as the mid-1960s; 
and, even in the last third of the century, finally ousted only through a 
prolonged, contested process (Gidney and Millar 2001, 275).
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Less than a decade before the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
the Ministry of Education in Ontario had tried to remove the purely Christian basis 
from a statement and expectation that required teachers to uphold and teach 
Christian morality. Public outrage followed this proposed minor change. In light of 
this social opposition, the Ministry of Education compromised and inserted Judeo- 
Christian morality instead of the more specific reference to Christian morality 
(Gidney and Millar 2001, 285).
Zylberberg vs. Sudbury Board of Education (1988): The Zylberberg case
concerned religious exercises (prayer) in the schools, but not religious education. 
Zylberberg was a challenge to Ministry of Education Regulation 262, Section 28(1) 
which required religious exercises at the start and end of each school day in Ontario. 
These religious exercises included the Lord’s Prayer and in some cases also 
included the singing of religious hymns during the start or closing exercises in public 
schools (Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 368). This was the norm in public schools 
throughout Canada, even though students were not compelled to participate.
The Ontario Divisional Court, the lower court where the case was first tried, 
determined in a two-to-one decision that there was no infringement on freedoms. 
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Leary held that even if there were an infringement 
of section 2(a) of the Charter, such an infringement would be permissible under 
Section 1 of the Charter. It is useful here to quote directly from the Appeal Court 
summary of the Divisional Court Judgment
In the Divisional Court, O’Leary J. Held that the religious exercises 
prescribed by s. 28(1) did not infringe the guarantee of freedom of
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conscience and religion provided by s. 2(a) of the Charter. 
Alternatively, he held that, if the Charter freedom was infringed, the 
infringement was justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter which provides:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.
He [Justice O’Leary] was of the view the inculcation of morality was a 
proper educational object and that morality and religion were 
intertwined. If this resulted in any infringement on minority religious 
beliefs, it was not substantial. He pointed out that the religious 
exercises did not have to be Christian and, except in the case of non­
believers, could be consistent with the Charter which, in its preamble, 
recognizes “the supremacy of God and the rule of law” (Ontario Court 
of Appeal 1988, pp. 12).
At the Divisional Court, Justice Anderson, concurring with Justice O’Leary, held that
there would be an infringement only if children at school were coerced into
participating in the religious exercises. Anderson found that religious exercises in
the schools did not coerce students and their parents because of the religious
exemption already noted (Ontario Court of Appeal 1988, pp. 13). In his dissent at
the Divisional Court, Justice Reid found that it was not acceptable to allow the
religious exercises to take place. It is interesting to note, that in its submission to the
court, the Board had originally agreed that the Regulation was in fact an
infringement of Section 2(a) of the Charter, but argued that such infringement was
permissible under section 1.
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the majority decision of the
Divisional Court. The Ontario Court of Appeal employed the Oakes test and found
that the infringement as acknowledged by the Board did not meet the requirements
of Oakes, and thus it was impossible to save the infringement under Section 1 of the
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Charter. For the significance of this finding and, as I shall refer to the Oakes test 
again, it is helpful to explain the Oakes test here. The Oakes test refers to the way 
Section (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is applied. Section (1) 
states
(1)The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.
In order to limit defined rights and freedoms, the onus of responsibility is on the state 
to demonstrate justification. What followed was a four-fold test. The first test is 
whether such restriction is “logically connected to the accomplishment of some 
legitimate and significant government purpose. Second, the degree to which the 
right or freedom is infringed upon must be proportional to the importance of 
government purpose. Third, the law must limit the right or freedom as little as 
possible. Finally, it must be demonstrated that the same purpose cannot be 
achieved in some other way which would result in less infringement on the right or 
freedom (Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 369).
In the Ontario Court of Appeal’s judgement in Zylberberg, the Court found that
it follows from our analysis that s. 28(1) of the Regulations constitutes 
a prima facie infringement of the appellants' rights under s. 2(a) of the 
Charter. In a usual Charter case, the burden passes at this stage to the 
parties upholding the Charter infringement to show on a balance of 
probabilities that it is justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter: R. v. Oakes, 
supra. In this case, however, the appellants contended that, since the 
very purpose of s. 28 of the Regulations violated s. 2(a) of the Charter, 
it was incapable of justification under s. 1 (Ontario Court of Appeal 
1988).
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The court further understood from the pleadings before it that there was an 
historical element to this case, but decided that it was invalidated in light of 
the new Charter realities. The Court wrote
The appellants contended that there was no saving secular purpose in 
s. 28(1). Its wording and, in the appellant's submission, its legislative 
background going back to the earliest times indicated that its purpose 
was religious and that, like the Lord's Day Act in Big M, it was 
incapable of justification under s. 1. The Attorney-General and the 
Board, on the other hand, asserted that s. 28(1) had paramount 
secular objectives, both educational and moral, and that the religious 
exercises served those purposes.
In support of their arguments, counsel on both sides referred us to the 
reports of the Hope Commission, the Mackay Committee, and other 
historical materials.
After a careful consideration of the Act, the Regulations, and other 
materials placed before us, we have concluded that the purpose of s.
28(1) is religious and that the exercises mandated by the Regulation 
were intended to be religious exercises. This is the only conclusion 
which can be drawn from the wording of the Act and the Regulations.
This view is confirmed by the specific provision for exemption 
contained in s. 50(2) of the Act which for illustrative purposes we 
repeat:
50(2) No pupil in a public school shall be required to read or study in 
or from a religious book, or to join in an exercise of devotion or religion, 
objected to by his parent or guardian, or by the pupil, where he is an 
adult.
It is clear that the exemption provision is included in the Act because 
the exercises were intended to serve religious and not secular 
purposes (Ontario Court of Appeal 1988).
It was in this context that the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the educational 
regulations and practices infringed on the freedoms of the plaintiffs in the Zylberberg 
case and the court process was used to remove established religious exercises from 
public schools. Although the removal of religious exercises had been recommended 
by the MacKay Commission, the government had not acted in light of the political
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risk and perceived public response (Gidney and Millar 2001, 284). Change was not 
accomplished until the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was invoked to 
finalize this outcome. As there was no further appeal on the part of the School 
Board or the provincial government, this became the law in Ontario and religious 
exercises were excised from public schools.
This ruling was really just the start of the movement to remove religious 
exercises and religious education from the public school systems. As I will show in 
subsequent cases, further efforts were successfully expended to complete the 
removal of religious education from the public school systems. It should also be 
noted that this case had implications across the country as well, in that “reasoning 
used by the Ontario Court of Appeal in striking down religious opening exercises 
{Zylberberg) was adopted in its entirety by the British Columbia Supreme Court in a 
parallel case (Russow v. British Columbia [Attorney General], 1989” (Dickinson and 
Dolmage 1996, 367).
Elgin County (1988): In Elgin County the case was still about religion, but focused 
on the religious education regulations rather than religious exercises at the start and 
end of the school day. These religious education classes were conducted for half 
hour periods twice per week. The rule in question, Ministry of Education Regulation 
262, section 18, subsection 4, read as follows:
Two periods per week of one-half hour each, in addition to the time 
assigned to religious exercises at the opening or closing of a public 
school, shall by devoted to religious education (High Court of Justice, 
Divisional Court 1988, pp 20).
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The standard opt out clause applied so that no student (being of legal age) or the 
parents of a minor child who objected was forced to attend, and there was also an 
iron clad opt out clause for teachers (Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 369).
In the Elgin County School District, in the south eastern part of Ontario, it 
should be noted that until just before the start of the trial, religious education was 
exclusively Christian in nature. The Board justified this practice because despite 
multiple local religious denominations, “in excess of 90% of Elgin County's residents 
are of Christian background” (High Court of Justice, Divisional Court 1988, pp. 69). 
In order to understand the background to the issues at hand in the Elgin County 
case, it is important to understand some of the history of religious education in the 
county. I will use as a starting point 1974, which is where the court started its 
evaluation as well. As I have written in an earlier chapter, the 1960s and 1970s 
were a period of social, demographic, and political change.
The years 1974-1978 brought about some changes in the religious curriculum 
in the Elgin County School District. The new curriculum was prepared by the 
Religious Education Committee which included members of the local ministerial 
association and the Elgin County Bible Club, as well as elected members of the 
school board and school board staff members. This Religious Education Committee 
of the Elgin County School District set up a new curriculum which included bible 
stories for elementary school children to study. The new education curriculum was 
to be taught by teachers, ordained ministers or others, but according to the evidence 
it was mainly taught by lay volunteers with the Elgin County Bible Club starting at an 
early time under the new curriculum (High Court of Justice, Divisional Court 1988,
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pp. 70). In 1983, there was a new revision to the curriculum guidelines for religious 
education in Elgin County. The recommendations for the new system were:
The objective of the religious education program in the schools of Elgin 
County would be to provide pupils with a religious context, primarily 
Christian, in which to develop appropriate responses to life’s situations.
It should not be assumed by a statement of this objective that other 
religious bodies and even non-religious interests are to be ignored. 
Rather, it is hoped that moral, ethical and religious concerns which 
they hold in common with Christianity will be the primary content of any 
religious education program in the public schools. As such groups 
become more numerous in proportion to the population, this objective 
should be reviewed in light of their concerns (High Court of Justice, 
Divisional Court 1988, pp. 71).
Thus the curriculum was not a fixed constant across multiple generations and effort 
was being made to highlight moral education ahead of Christian religious doctrine. 
In 1985 a newly elected school board resolved to review religious education once 
again. By the next year, a new handbook had been devised and it is instructive here 
to quote directly from it to show how religious content in education reflected an 
enduring commitment to articulate and promote common moral values. Even as 
Christian civic piety remained at the core of religious education, significant efforts 
were made to adapt it to the realities of religious and social pluralism.
To provide pupils with a religious context in which to develop an 
understanding of the moral and religious values of the local 
community.
To foster an appreciation for the child’s religious tradition and the 
traditions of others.
To help the pupil become aware of the moral principle by which people 
act.
To contribute to the development of reasoning which a person uses to 
reach moral decisions.
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While knowledge of the Old Testament is basic to the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, the variety of denominational and ethnic backgrounds of 
school pupils requires that the lessons outlined be suitable and 
interesting to students with varied religious and philosophic 
orientations.
Pupils, through the lessons provided will acquire general knowledge of 
other people’s beliefs and cultures so that they can communicate and 
live as world citizens.
The habit of critical examinations of both one’s own and other’s beliefs 
is crucial to understanding one’s own values: Public School education 
recognizes the freedom of the individual to interpret religious and moral 
questions according to conscience. In the same vein, a child has a 
right to knowledge or a heritage supportive of home and community.
Freedom of conscience is a fundamental right of the public schools. 
Provisions for exemption by reason of conscience is clearly set out in 
Regulation 262 for both pupil and teacher.
Values and attitudes will be transmitted in the public school but 
commitment to theology of any religious body belongs to the home and 
the tradition of worship of the home.
The religious education programme aims to create a caring, sharing 
atmosphere which recognizes each person’s self-worth. The 
programme is intended to help a child begin to develop a personal 
value structure (High Court of Justice, Divisional Court 1988, pp. 75).
Clearly there was an attempt to maintain some core Christian components of the 
religious curriculum, but there was also a move to acknowledge other faiths in light 
of the socio-political developments in Canada at the time. The importance of this 
acknowledgement of other faiths was crucial to the application of the new rules. 
These developments, however, were not enough to stop the Corporation for 
Canadian Civil Liberties and a number of parents from suing the School Board to 
curtail religious education in the public schools.
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I shall replicate some of the court’s ruling here for clarity. The Ontario Court 
of Appeal noting that the Divisional Court had found there to be no infringement, 
stated that the Divisional Court ruled
The majority of the Divisional Court (Watt and McKeown JJ.) held that 
neither the purpose nor the effects of the regulation infringed s. 2(a) of 
the Charter. In their opinion the regulation did not, either in purpose or 
effects, compel, coerce or constrain anyone because s. 28(10) clearly 
stated that no pupil, where there is an application for exemption, shall 
be required to take part in any religious exercise, or be subject to any 
instruction in religion. The purpose of religious education, said the 
majority, was to introduce a moral element into the education of public 
elementary school pupils whereby, together with intellectual instruction, 
they may become adequately equipped for the task of the work life.
There was no sectarian purpose of religious indoctrination in 
majoritarian Christian precepts (Ontario Court of Appeal 1990, pp. 14).
Nor was the majority persuaded that the effects of the section, viewed 
as a whole, were of such a nature or extent as to violate s. 2(a) of 
the Charter (Ontario Court of Appeal 1990, pp. 15).
In the case of Elgin County, the Court had to determine whether the rights of 
students were violated through the provision of religious education. To do that, they 
had to determine what the purpose of the impugned Regulations from the Ministry of 
Education was in the case at hand. The Court was trying balance between the 
effects and the purpose of the Regulations in question. The Court of Appeal in its 
Elgin County ruling quotes Justice Dickson in the R. v. Big Drug Mart Ltd. case. The 
court noted that Justice Dickson wrote
[T]he legislation's purpose is the initial test of constitutional validity and 
its effects are to be considered when the law under review has passed 
or, at least, has purportedly passed the purpose test. ... [T]he effects 
test will only be necessary to defeat legislation with a valid purpose; 
effects can never be relied upon to save legislation with an invalid 
purpose (Ontario Court of Appeal 1990, pp. 37)
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Dickson also noted that it is the original legislative intent that is relevant. He noted,
again in Big Drug Mart
Furthermore, in Big M, Dickson J. went on, at pp. 352-3, to assert that 
it is the original legislative purpose that is relevant; he explicitly 
rejected the American notion of a "shifting purpose", by which the 
purpose of the law could change with changing social conditions. He 
suggested that effects may change, but the purpose of legislation 
remains constant (Ontario Court of Appeal 1990, pp. 38).
Dickson was arguing that one must then ascertain what the purpose of the 
impugned Regulations is. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the regulations did 
indeed violate the Charter rights of the students in question. The Court of Appeal 
noted
The short answer is that it must. State-authorized religious 
indoctrination amounts to the imposition of majoritarian religious beliefs 
on minorities. Although s. 2(a) of the Charter is not infringed merely 
because education may be consistent with the religious beliefs of the 
majority of Canadians (see Edwards Books, supra, p. 35), teaching 
students Christian doctrine as if it were the exclusive means through 
which to develop moral thinking and behaviour amounts to religious 
coercion in the class-room. It creates a direct burden on religious 
minorities and non-believers who do not adhere to majoritarian beliefs.
That this amounts to violation of s. 2(a) of the Charter, especially when 
viewed in the light of s. 27 of the Charter (Ontario Court of Appeal 
1990, pp. 55)
The Court of Appeal in Elgin County did note that there was an attempt to include 
other religions in the version of the curriculum deployed at the time of the case. The 
difference between the teaching about for example Buddhism and Islam is that these 
exercises were only about the religions. According to the Court, the examples about 
Christianity were indoctrinational. The Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he treatment of 
other religions is, as one might expect, entirely non-indoctrinal (Ontario Court of 
Appeal 1990, pp. 115).
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To summarize its judgement, it is best to quote from the Court of Appeal 
judgement directly. The Court of Appeal wrote
In Zylberberg, supra, a majority of this court held that if the true 
purpose of the legislation was to compel religious observance, it could 
not be justified under s. 1. Similarly, in this case, where we have found 
that the true purpose of the impugned regulation is to indoctrinate 
children in the Christian faith, we do not believe that the infringement 
can be justified under s. 1 (Ontario Court of Appeal 1990, pp. 129).
The problem, as determined by the Court of Appeal, was that the purpose of the 
Section 28(4) of Regulation 262 was indoctrination. The mere instruction of religious 
knowledge may have been permissible. The court found, however, that even if the 
intended purposes of the regulation were found not to be indoctrination, the 
regulation would still be a violation of the constitution because it was indoctrination in 
effect.
This determination led the regulation to be considered a violation of Section 
2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Canada, which guarantees freedom of 
religion and conscience (Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 370). The court also looked 
at whether the impugned section of Ministry of Education Regulation 262 might be 
salvaged under Section 1 of the Charter using the Oakes test as outlined earlier. 
The Court of Appeal found that the Oakes test could not save the regulation and as 
such the Elgin County Board of Education was ordered to stop their religious 
education curriculum education in all their schools.
As this was a ruling from the highest court in Ontario, it applied to all the other 
public Boards of Education in Ontario as well. As a result, the Ontario government 
sent out Memorandum 112/1991. This Memorandum, in accordance with the Court
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of Appeal ruling in Elgin County, stated that public schools in Ontario were to 
immediately stop all education which might be construed as religious education and 
indoctrination. Regulation 262 was replaced with Regulation 298, and sections 28 
and 29 allowed schools to offer “education about religion”, but not religious 
education (Dickinson and Dolmage 1996, 370). The difference is more than 
semantics: religious education was now considered to be indoctrinational in purpose, 
even if not intent. ‘Education about religion’ on the other hand would allow for the 
information of many different religions to be communicated to students in Ontario 
public schools.
Unlike the Zylberberg case, which focused on religious exercises, the Elgin 
County case was specifically about religious education. At the time of the law suit, 
the law in Ontario stated that there should be religious exercises in the public 
schools. In the Elgin County School district religious education was Christian in 
nature. The court found this religious education to be incompatible with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the School District and the Ontario 
provincial government did not appeal. This ruling meant that religious education of 
the nature found in the Elgin County School District was no longer permitted 
anywhere in Ontario. Despite the fact that religious education had a long history in 
the public schools and had been approved (and encouraged) by locally elected 
school boards, the practice was suddenly terminated as a result of the Court’s 
decision.
Russow vs. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1989): In British Columbia, 
public education had been non-denominational since its inception. Despite the
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secular foundation, however, religious exercises were introduced due to public 
pressure in 1944. This was in response to pressure from parents who felt that the 
need to inculcate the morals and values of the dominant society was not just a 
matter for the home, but for the schools as well.
In 1989 some parents challenged the religious exercise components of the 
British Columbia education system in Russow vs. British Columbia (Attorney 
General). It is helpful to trace the introduction of religious exercises into the British 
Columbia school system in order to understand their significance.
In 1876, just after British Columbia joined Confederation, British Columbia 
enacted section 40 included in An Act to amend and Consolidate the Public Schools 
Acts. Section 40 in 1876 read as follows:
All public schools established under the provisions of this Act shall be 
conducted upon strictly secular and non-sectarian principles. The 
highest morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogmas or creed 
shall be taught. All Judges, clergymen, members of the Legislature, 
and others interested in education, shall be school visitors (Supreme 
Court of British Columbia 1989, pp. 20).
In light of practice in public schools elsewhere, the law was amended in 1936 to add 
the Lord’s Prayer, after which section 160 of the Public Schools Act read as follows:
160. (1) Subject to subsection (2), all public schools shall be free and 
shall be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian principles.
The highest morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogma nor 
creed shall be taught. The Lord’s Prayer may be used in opening or 
closing school (Supreme Court of British Columbia 1989, pp. 21).
The key word in the new section was that the Lord’s Prayer may be used in opening 
and closing exercises. When I compare section 160 to the original section 40, the
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addition of permission to use the Lord’s Prayer constitutes a significant change. 
This addition paralleled similar public concerns in other provinces.
In 1944 there was another amendment to the Public School Act in British 
Columbia regarding religious exercises. These amendments introduced additional 
religious exercises to include the reading of scripture. Section 160 was revised to 
read:
Subject to subsection (2), all public schools shall be free. They shall 
be opened by the reading, without explanation or comment, of a 
passage of scripture to be selected from readings prescribed or 
approved by the Council of Public Instruction. The reading of the 
passage of scripture shall be followed by the recitation of the Lord’s 
Prayer, but otherwise the schools shall be conducted on strictly secular 
and non-sectarian principles. The highest morality shall be inculcated 
but no religious dogma or creed shall be taught (Supreme Court of 
British Columbia 1989, pp. 22).
This section of the Act was affirmed when the Act was amended in 1979. This 
section, which was contested in Russow vs. British Columbia, was now section 164. 
This section read as follows:
164. All public schools shall be opened by the reading, without 
explanation or comment of a passage of Scripture to be selected from 
readings prescribed or approved by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council. The reading of the passage of Scripture shall be followed by 
the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, but otherwise the schools shall be 
conducted on strictly secular non-sectarian principles. The highest 
morality shall be inculcated, but no religious dogma or creed shall be 
taught (Supreme Court of British Columbia 1989, pp. 23).
It should be noted that, as in the Ontario cases, there was an exemption for parents 
or students who were not willing to be part of the opening and closing religious 
exercises in British Columbia public schools.
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The court ruled that the religious exercises then deployed in British Columbia 
schools were an infringement against section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (Supreme Court of British Columbia 1989, pp14). The court did not 
elaborate detailed reasons as the judgement was based on the Zylberberg case in 
Ontario. In the original case report, Justice Hollinrake simply attached the rulings 
from the Zylberberg case to his judgement (Supreme Court of British Columbia 
1989, pp13).
Russow was similar to the Zylberberg case in that both dealt with religious 
exercises in schools as opposed to religious education. The case of Russow dealt 
with the religious exercises in British Columbia schools. The case was similar to 
Zylberberg in that the students were offered an exemption from the exercises if they 
(being of legal age) or their parents wanted them to be excused. This was deemed 
insufficient protection by the court. This case was not appealed by Provincial 
government and thus became the law in British Columbia. The case of Russow 
was, as with the Zylberberg and Elgin County cases an example of how the courts 
were used to remove the privileged place of religion from schools across Canada. 
All these examples of religious exercises and religious education in Ontario and 
British Columbia which were removed by the courts are examples of the effects of 
the original Christian Civic Piety upon which Canada was founded. These cases 
were only possible after the adoption of the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms.
Adler vs. Ontario (1996): Unlike cases which sought to remove the influence of 
religion in education, such as Zylberberg, Elgin County and Russow, the Adler case
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dealt with a challenge concerning how independent, religious schools in Ontario 
were funded. The parents of Jewish and Christian Reformed students challenged 
the fact that in Ontario, Roman Catholic schools received public funding while other 
faith schools did not.
The refusal of the province of Ontario to fund non-Roman Catholic religious 
schools in that province was found to be constitutional. Parents who felt 
disadvantaged by Ontario policy had challenged the government on two grounds, 
namely that their rights under Sections 2(a) and 15 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms were violated. The Divisional Court, the Ontario Court of Appeal and the 
Canadian Supreme Court all disagreed with the parents and denied their application.
As the Supreme Court is the final court of appeal, I will focus on their ruling. 
As mentioned earlier, the public schools of Ontario were envisioned by Ryerson and 
others to be agents of Christian morality and socialization. Since Roman Catholics 
were to have their own schools, the public schools were infused with Protestant, 
non-denominational values (Gidney and Millar 2001, 275). The Supreme Court 
noted that
public schools are contemplated in the terms of s. 93, as it applies to 
Ontario, the Court, is in my opinion not looking to the historical nature 
of this system. In order to claim the protection of s. 93, it must be 
shown that there was a right or privilege with respect to denominational 
schooling which was enjoyed by a class of persons by law at the time 
of union (Supreme Court of Canada 1996).
In the ruling at the Ontario Court (General Division), Justice Anderson found that the 
lack of funding was an infringement on the rights of the plaintiffs. He also found
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however, that based on the Oakes test as outlined earlier, the infringement was 
justified. The Supreme Court ruling quotes from his judgement as follows
However, Anderson J. concluded that the legislation in question was 
saved by s.1 of the Charter. In his view, the legislative objectives, 
including the provision of tuition-free, secular, universally accessible 
public education, and the establishment of a public education system 
fostering and promoting the values of a pluralistic, democratic society, 
were of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally 
protected right or freedom. He found there to be a rational connection 
between those objectives and the means chosen to achieve them. He 
held that the “degree of impairment” of the appellants’ rights was 
“within permissible limits.” Finally, he held that the benefits of the 
legislation were proportionate to its adverse effects on the appellants 
(Supreme Court of Canada 1996, pp. 13).
The Ontario Court of Appeal did not agree with Justice Anderson, however, and 
ruled even further against the parents. For the majority, Justice Dubin wrote that
Anderson J. had erred in finding a s. 2(a) violation. In his view, s. 2(a) 
did not provide a positive entitlement to state support for the exercise 
of one's religion. A breach can only consist in state action which 
denies or limits religious practice” (Supreme Court of Canada 1996, 
pp. 14).
The Supreme Court in Adler further noted that it is not possible to hold one section 
of the Constitution to violate another one. The majority noted that Section 93 of the 
Constitution Act only applies to those groups which held special status at the time of 
Confederation. It does not apply to other groups that are now trying to claim these 
same rights. It is helpful to quote here directly from the ruling
the appellants’ attempt to use s. 2(a) in combination with s. 15(1) to 
expand on s. 93's religious educational guarantees. Thus, just as s. 23 
is a comprehensive code with respect to minority language education 
rights, s. 93 is a comprehensive code with respect to denominational 
school rights. As a result, s. 2(a) of the Charter cannot be used to 
enlarge this comprehensive code. Given that the appellants cannot 
bring themselves within the terms of s. 93's guarantees, they have no 
claim to public funding for their schools. To emphasize, in Ontario, s.
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93(1) entrenches certain rights with respect to public funding of 
religious education. However, these rights are limited to those which 
were enjoyed at the time of Confederation. To decide otherwise by 
accepting the appellants’ claim that s. 2(a) requires public funding of 
their religious schools would be to hold one section of the Constitution 
violative of another (Supreme Court of Canada 1996).
The other issue for the court to deal with was the claim on the part of the plaintiffs 
that while separate schools might be unique in their situation in Ontario due to the 
Confederation Compromise; the public school system is not. The Supreme Court 
notes that the parents argued
The appellants advanced a further argument which was that, even 
assuming that Roman Catholic separate schools are given a privileged 
place in our constitutional scheme, public schools are given no such 
protection. According to this argument, the fact that the government 
funds public schools but not private religious schools is analogous to 
the government funding, for example, private Christian schools but not 
private Islamic schools. As the reasoning goes, public schools are not 
a part of the scheme envisioned by s. 93 and are, thus, open to 
Charter challenge.
In my view, this argument is mistaken in supposing that public schools 
are not contemplated by the terms of s. 93, as it applies to Ontario. On 
the contrary, the public school system is an integral part of the s. 93 
scheme. When the province funds public schools, it is, in the words of 
Wilson J. in Reference Re Bill 30, at p. 1198, legislating “pursuant to 
the plenary power in relation to education granted to the provincial 
legislatures as part of the Confederation compromise.” A closer 
examination of s. 93, in particular s. 93(1), as it applies to the province 
of Ontario, will help to illustrate that the public school system is 
impliedly, but nonetheless clearly, contemplated by the terms of that 
section (Supreme Court of Canada 1996, pp. 40-41).
The public schools in Ontario at the time of Confederation were to be protestant in 
form, although clearly non-denominational. This was what was to differentiate them 
from the Separate Catholic School system (Gidney and Millar 2001, 275).
The Supreme Court further stated that “in order to claim the protection of s. 
93, it must be shown that there was a right or privilege with respect to
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denominational schooling which was enjoyed by a class of persons, by law, at the
time of union” (Supreme Court of Canada 1996, pp. 42). The Supreme Court further 
noted that
An Act to restore to Roman Catholics in Upper Canada certain rights in 
respect to Separate Schools, S. Prov. C. 1863, c. 5 (Scott Act), was 
the last piece of legislation relating to denominational schools in Upper 
Canada enacted before Confederation. In essence, what this 
legislation did was to define the rights and privileges of Roman 
Catholic separate schools in terms of the rights and privileges of the 
province’s common schools. The preamble reads:
WHEREAS it is just and proper to restore to 
Roman Catholics in Upper Canada certain rights 
which they formerly enjoyed in respect to 
separate Schools, and to bring the provisions of 
the Law respecting Separate Schools more in 
harmony with the provisions of the Law 
respecting Common Schools. . . . [Emphasis 
added.]
This close linkage between the separate and public schools was made 
most clearly through s. 7 which gave the separate school trustees “all 
the powers in respect of Separate Schools, that the Trustees of 
Common Schools have and possess under the provisions of the Act 
relating to Common Schools” and through s. 9 which gave the 
separate school trustees all “the same duties . . .  as Trustees of 
Common Schools.” Section 20 of the Scott Act required that separate 
schools receive a proportionate share of the funds annually granted by 
the legislature to support the common schools. Even the qualification 
of separate school teachers was to be determined according to the 
same standards used in the public schools (Supreme Court of Canada 
1996, pp. 43).
As I have shown earlier in this thesis, the public school system in Upper Canada 
(now Ontario) was to be resolutely Christian based in order to inculcate good morals 
and strong citizens. This was the way Ryerson established the system. Perhaps 
the Supreme Court was correct in dismissing the case against the province brought 
by the Jewish appellants for this reason, but it is my opinion that they were incorrect
in dismissing the appeal from the Christian parents for this reason. As I have shown
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from the writing of Gidney and Millar, the Christian domination of the public school 
system was well entrenched in law through the 1980s, until the use of the Charter 
and Rights and Freedoms was used to excise it from the public school system in 
Ontario.
This ruling might be considered to be a narrow interpretation of the meaning 
of the Confederation compromise. The Confederation compromise as it refers to 
education is not really complicated. The Fathers of Confederation wanted a deal, 
but when they met in London for the final sessions, the issue of minority education 
rights was a thorn in their discussions. In the end, what the Fathers of 
Confederation resolved was to protect the rights of the school systems as they 
existed at the time they entered Confederation; and even though education was to 
be a provincial responsibility under the British North America Act which created the 
union, there would be the possibility of an appeal to the federal government if these 
rights were abused.6
It is interesting to note that dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court decision 
led to the Adler argument being brought to the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission. In Grant Tadman v. Canada (1997), appellants successfully argued 
against the inequality of public funding for Catholic religious schools without 
comparable support for other faiths or non-faiths. While the UNHRC disagreed with 
the Supreme Court of Canada, the Commission lacked any authority to compel 
compliance, and referred the matter to the Federal Government, which used the
6 For more on the debates surrounding the educational rights in the new Canada, please see 
Creighton Donald, 1964. The Road to Confederation, The Emergence o f Canada: 1863-1867.
Toronto. MacMillan of Canada
established position of the Confederation Compromise to defend the status quo. In 
other words, although the UNHRC considered public funding only for Catholic 
schools a violation of equal practice, the Canadian government relied on the 
constitutional division of powers and the 120 year old compromise in order to inhibit 
any requirement to renegotiate funding for religious education. The political 
compromise between English and French and the estimated financial cost to extend 
funding to other faith-based schools were considered to be reasonable justification 
to ignore the decision by the United Nations Human Rights Commission.
Adler is important in that it shows the Court was willing to defend certain 
established practices and historical aspects of the Confederation Compromise 
regarding education (Supreme Court of Canada 1996, pp. 29). In the Confederation 
Compromise regarding education in Upper Canada, there were to be two school 
systems in Ontario, the Catholic system and the public system, and both were to be 
infused with Christian values. In the Supreme Court’s ruling on Adler, the court 
ignored this Christian sentiment and only focused on the role of the Catholic system 
and the public system, and at best implied that the public system at Confederation 
was secular. This was not the case. The original educational system stemming 
from the Confederation Compromise was Christian by nature; it was simply split into 
Catholic and protestant streams, with the protestant stream adopting all the children 
from all non-Catholic faiths even if they were not Christian. This was the point which 
the Supreme Court expressly ignored in the Adler judgment.
The four cases examined so far are examples of the move from the original 
Canadian Christian civic piety to a new democratic faith. While three of the cases
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dealt with the issues of religious exercises and religious education, the fourth dealt 
with the funding of education based on religious principles. This principle of funding 
schools in Ontario based on faith principles was a basic concept of the 
Confederation Compromise. The Supreme Court of Canada decided not to accept 
this perspective.
All four cases do have a commonality in that they deal with the role of religion 
in education. This is in keeping with the principles of the original civil religion in 
Canada, namely Christian civic piety. With the outcomes of these cases, I shall 
demonstrate examples of the emergence of a new civil religion in Canada, namely 
democratic faith. The democratic faith civil religion arises because the new value 
structure for the education system is not to have any historical religious references 
to it anymore. The values are those laid out by the state and accepted and asserted 
by various parent groups or governments through the courts. The cases examined 
so far have a common thread in that they all served to work toward the elimination of 
Christian civic piety from one of the most important sectors of society; namely 
education.
The next two cases are different in that they speak to the rise of democratic 
faith civil religion in Canada. In the first four cases, the Courts were used as shields 
against the action of the state. In the following two cases, the Courts are used by the 
state as a sword to enforce its will on the populace. What I say here is not to 
impugn the integrity of the Courts, but rather to outline what has happened.
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The first four cases all saw something that had existed for a long time 
removed from the school system, namely Christianity. The courts were used to 
enforce the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms claims of the parents 
involved in each case. The shield reference is simply meant to state that the 
plaintiffs in each of these cases used the courts to further their own ends and that 
the courts were able to be used to defend them from actions of the state. In the 
reference to the last two cases, and the reference to the sword, I am referring to the 
action of the state being imposed on people, and the courts not supporting the 
people by giving a victory to the government so far in both cases. The Loyola High 
School case is, however, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chenes (2012): In 2012 comes the case of S.L. 
v. Commission scolaire des Chenes in Quebec. This case dealt not with funding but 
with the new Ethics and Religious Culture (“ERC”) Course which had been made 
mandatory by the provincial ministry in all Quebec private and public schools. This 
case concerned a pair of Drummondville Catholic Quebec parents who objected to 
having their children taught the new Ethics and Religious Culture course at their 
school. Parents were concerned that their children would suffer harm as a result of 
being taught information which the parents felt was significantly different from the 
principles they were being taught at home and in their church. The goal of the 
Ethics and Religious Culture course was to teach about various religious realities in 
a neutral way, including Aboriginal Spirituality and various approaches to ethics. 
The parents in question felt that this neutrality would be at odds with their beliefs and 
the right to pass on their beliefs to their children because the mandated course
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promoted all religious beliefs as being equal. They requested an exemption under 
section 222 of the Quebec Education Act. Section 222 states:
222. Every school board shall ensure that the basic school regulation 
established by the Government is implemented in accordance with the 
gradual implementation procedure established by the Minister under 
section 459.
For humanitarian reasons or to avoid serious harm to a student, 
the school board may, following a request, with reasons, made by 
the parents of the student, by the student, if of full age, or by the 
school principal, exempt the student from the application of a 
provision of the basic school regulation. In the case of an 
exemption from the rules governing certification of studies referred to 
in section 460, the school board must apply therefor to the Minister.
The school board may also, subject to the rules governing certification 
of studies prescribed by the basic school regulation, permit a departure 
from a provision of the basic school regulation so that a special school 
project applicable to a group of students may be carried out. However, 
a departure from the list of subjects may only be permitted in the cases 
and on the conditions determined by a regulation of the Minister made 
under section 457.2 or with the authorization of the Minister given in 
accordance with section 459.
1988, c. 84, s. 222; 1990, c. 78, s. 54; 1997, c. 96, s. 60; 2004, c. 38, 
s. 3.
222.1. Every school board shall ensure that the programs of studies 
established by the Minister under section 461 are implemented.
However, a school board may, at the request of a school principal, 
after consulting with the student's parents and subject to the rules 
governing certification of studies prescribed by the basic school 
regulation, exempt a student who needs special support services in the 
language of instruction, second language or mathematics program 
from a subject prescribed by the basic school regulation; no exemption 
may be granted, however, in respect of those programs.
As well, a school board may, with the authorization of and subject 
to the conditions determined by the Minister, allow a school to 
replace a program of studies established by the Minister by a 
local program of studies designed for a student or a category of 
students who are unable to benefit from the programs of studies 
established by the Minister. Every such local program of studies
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must be submitted by the school board to the Minister for 
approval (Ministry of Education 2012).7
The parents lost their court battle to exempt their children from the ERC class 
and also lost all subsequent appeals.
Originally, the Quebec school system was setup on denominational grounds, 
with the separation being Catholic and Protestant. In 1997, the Quebec and 
Canadian federal governments revised the Canadian Constitution, namely (Section 
93) to add an additional Section 93(a) which removed the denominational aspect of 
Quebec schooling and replaced it with a linguistic separation of schools (Supreme 
Court of Canada 2012, pp. 12).
With this change, the entire structure of education in Quebec changed. This 
change, according to the Minister of Education, meant that every child would be able 
to feel comfortable in the schools they attended and not be pressured by the 
religious nature of the previous system. The Minister in 1997 stated, “Public Schools 
must respect the free choice or the free refusal of religion” (Supreme Court of 
Canada 2012, pp. 13). This was what the parents in S. L. v. Des Chenes were 
testing when they wanted to exempt their children from the curriculum adopted by 
the provincial government in 2012.
In 1997, the Quebec Minister of Education had announced the establishment 
of a task force to study what the new educational system in Quebec should 
encompass. The Commission, in its 1999 report entitled “Religion in Secular 
Schools: A New Perspective for Quebec”, declared that the system should include
7 [Emphasis added]
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moral education, and also that religions should be studied from a cultural 
perspective (Supreme Court of Canada 2012, pp. 15). In 2005, the Ethics and 
Religious Culture course was introduced, but it did not become mandatory until the 
2008/2009 school year.
In paragraph 22 of the S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chenes ruling, the 
majority noted that in the case of Amselem, it was not necessary to prove a sincere 
belief that was held by all the others8 of a religion, but that the belief in question 
must “hav[e] a nexus with religion.” Simply put, this means that not all people need 
to have a common approach to their religion, even within the same denomination. In 
such a case, the court is then “limited to assessing the sincerity of the person’s 
belief.” This is at odds with a later statement in the ruling in paragraph 24, where the 
majority ruling states “It follows that when considering an infringement of freedom of 
religion, the question is not whether the person sincerely believes that a religious 
practice or belief has been infringed, but whether a religious practice or belief exists 
that has been infringed.” The majority in the same paragraph later states “to decide 
otherwise would allow persons to conclude for themselves that their rights had been 
infringed and thus to supplant the courts in this role.”
This tension seems to be the crux of the matter for the majority, and both 
avoids and confuses the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada. The parents of 
the school age children were not asking for their specific religion to be taught. They 
were seeking an exemption from the Ethics and Religious Culture course as 
designed by the government. This request for exemption was no less reasonable,
8 Emphasis added
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and even more so than any demands made in Zylberberg, Russow or previous 
cases reviewed here. Clearly the question was not about whether they felt their 
religion should be given a paramount place over any other, and just as clear is that 
they simply wanted their children to be able to get the education they as parents 
desired. In its ruling, the majority of the Court went a long way in supplanting the 
rights and role of the parents in the educational role of their children, and assumed a 
position that philosophically was at odds with the jurisprudence of Zylberberg, Elgin 
County and Russow. Stated another way, these earlier cases had determined that 
voluntary self-exclusion was not sufficient protection against the promotion or 
indoctrination of Christian civic piety. Now, however, the request to be excluded 
from a relativistic curriculum of religion was being rejected by the Courts as at odds 
with the promotion or indoctrination of the Ethics and Religious Culture course.
To say that the Ethics and Religious Culture course did not have the potential 
to confuse the children is to ignore the evidence before the Court, even though that 
is what Justice J. Dubois of the Superior Court seems to have done. In paragraph 36 
of the Supreme Court of Canada ruling, the ruling of the Superior Court of Quebec is 
quoted
Under the new program, the school will present the range of different 
religions and get children to talk about self-recognition and the 
common good. Subsequently, therefore, the additional work that must 
be done for religious practice is up to the parents and pastors of the 
Church to which the parents and children belong.
‘Self-recognition and the common good’ are I believe major tenets of religions that I 
am familiar with. Self-recognition and common good ideas are self-identified values 
that people have. The children could get conflicting messages as to the value of
92
their and their parents beliefs depending on the information presented as part of the 
Ethics and Religions Course. How are the parents and pastors expected to teach 
their children their religious interpretations of these topics in the home and church 
environment if they are receiving different information from the secular school 
system? If these are not part of the tenets covered by most if not all major religions, 
there is very little left of these religions.
In a further confusion by the majority, in paragraph 37 the Supreme Court of 
Canada ruling states “After reviewing the record, I see no error in the trial judge’s 
assessment. Having adopted a policy of neutrality, the Quebec government cannot 
set up an education system that favours or hinders any one religion or a particular 
vision of religion.” This is absolutely correct. It is an unnecessary segue in this case 
however. The parents in S.L v. Commission Scolaire des Chenes were not looking 
for the government to give up the concept of neutrality. In fact, the crux of the 
parents’ argument was that the system that was being proposed was not in fact 
neutral, but promoted a system of religious relativism which was not acceptable to 
them as parents, and they felt it would cause harm and would confuse their children.
For all of its ruling, the Court could have saved time and simply gone to their 
last point, as this is what seemed to be the driving factor in their opinion. In 
paragraph 40 of the majority ruling, the court stated
Parents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their children if 
they so wish. However, the early exposure of children to realities that 
differ from those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life 
in society. The suggestion that exposing children to a variety of 
religious facts in itself infringes their religious freedom or that of their 
parents amounts to a rejection of the multicultural reality of Canadian
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society and ignores the Quebec government’s obligations with regard 
to public education. Although such exposure can be a source of 
friction, it does not itself constitute an infringement of s. 2(a) of the 
Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.
This section seems to be the crux of the majority argument in this case, but it is an 
opinion that might invite some concern for religious freedom. In this case, the 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined that it is more important to 
promote modern realities than to accept the parental wishes to exempt their children 
from the Ethics and Religious Culture course in Quebec, As I shall show later, it is 
interesting that the majority decision here refers to the needs of the Quebec public 
education system, as the next case I look at deals with a private religious institution 
and their fight with the order to implement the Ethics and Religious Culture course 
as designed by the Quebec government. Before I get to that case however, I will 
spend some time looking at the minority opinion in the S.L. v. Commission des 
Chenes case.
The minority ruling in the S.L. v. Commission des Chenes case is a 
concurring opinion, but differs significantly from the majority. Unlike the majority 
opinion, the concurring opinion found that there was not enough evidence on the 
record to ‘uphold the constitutional validity of the Ethics and Religious Culture 
program.’ It still ruled against the parents because they had not proven their case of 
harm as shall be shown here. To quote Justice LeBel,
However, I do not thereby intend to conclusively uphold the ERC 
Program’s constitutional validity or, above all, its specific application in 
the everyday workings of the education system. I will therefore make 
some comments on this subject in the reasons that follow” (Supreme 
Court of Canada 2012, pp. 44).
Justice LeBel notes that in the S.L. v. Commission des Chenes case,
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the allegation that freedom of religion was violated concerned a 
specific aspect of such freedom, namely the obligations of parents 
relating to the religious upbringing of their children and the passing on 
of their faith. The rights of parents to bring up their children in their faith 
is part of the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Canadian Charter 
(Supreme Court of Canada 2012, pp. 51).
In Justice LeBel’s opinion, the Superior Court, where the case was first heard, did 
not handle the manner correctly because the judge there did not apply the correct 
law as determined by the Supreme Court in earlier rulings. Justice LeBel notes that
The Superior Court turned this matter into a debate about the incorrect 
nature of the parents’ belief. The trial judge acknowledged that the 
parents were Catholics and that they believed they had an obligation to 
pass on their faith to their children. Having gotten to that stage, he did 
not consider the program’s content or is impact on the alleged belief 
(Supreme Court of Canada 2012, pp. 51).
According to Justice LeBel’s reading of the Superior Court ruling, the trial judge 
relied on the expert testimony offered by the respondent’s expert as to the nature of 
the course material in question. This opinion of Justice LeBel is at odds with the 
majority finding which found that the material on the record was sufficient for them to 
rule that the government was not infringing on the religious rights of the parents and 
children in question. Justice LeBel goes on to note that “[T]he trial judge should 
have endeavoured to consider in more concrete terms the program’s content and 
the impact claimed, correctly or not, by the appellants on the fulfillment of their 
religious obligations” (Supreme Court of Canada 2012, pp. 52).
As supportive of the appellants as Justice LeBel was, he does reach the 
conclusion that “[djespite being sincerely held, their opinion that basic moral 
relativism was the program’s essential characteristic was not sufficient to establish a 
violation of the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter.”
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Justice LeBel then turned the question around on both parties. He examined 
whether the course is really a problem for the parents or if the government claims of 
neutrality are correct. While the following quote is extensive, it is pertinent to this 
case and the subsequent case I shall address. Justice LeBel declared,
This brings us to one of the problems that arise in this matter in 
determining whether the ERC Program is consistent with Quebec’s 
constitutional obligations relating to freedom of religion. First, a finding 
of a violation of the two Charters cannot be based solely on a 
subjective perception of the program’s impact. Moreover, the 
Program’s design and the content of the educational and 
administrative framework do not make it easy to assess the program’s 
concrete impact in the everyday workings of Quebec’s public school 
system. In other words, is it a program that will provide all students 
with better knowledge of society’s diversity and teach them to be open 
to differences? Or is it an education tool designed to get religion out of 
children’s heads by taking an essentially agnostic or atheistic approach 
that denies any theoretical validity to the religious experience and 
religious values? Is the program consistent with the notion of 
secularism that has gradually been developed in constitutional cases, 
particularly in the field of education? The state of the record makes it 
impossible to answer these questions with confidence.
Justice LeBel writes that the evidence which was filed in the case does not permit 
the Court to find that the parents have proven their case. He states that the 
evidence presented by the parents, including the actual Ethics and Religious Culture 
course material and a textbook do not allow the Court to bring down a judgment of 
religious interference in violation of the Canadian and Quebec Charters. He noted 
that the program information which was filed as evidence by the parents “determines 
neither the content of the textbooks or educational materials to be used, nor their 
approach to religious facts or to the relationship between religious values and the 
ethical choices open to students” (Supreme Court of Canada 2012, pp. 56).
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The potential for future parents to be successful in challenging the ERC 
comes at the end of the concurring minority opinion, where Justice LeBel states
As a result of the state of the record, however, I am unable to conclude 
that the program and its implementation could not, in the future, 
possibly infringe the rights granted to the appellants and persons in the 
same situation. In this regard, the single textbook filed in the record 
may cause some confusion in terms of the way it presents the 
connection between the programs’ religious content and its ethical 
content. For example, does the content on the Christmas-related 
exercises for six-year-old students encourage the transformation of an 
experience and tradition into a form of folklore consisting merely of 
stories about mice or surprising neighbours? These are some 
potential questions and concerns. The record before this Court does 
not make it possible to respond to them. However, the legal situation 
could change during the existence of the ERC Program (Supreme 
Court of Canada 2012, pp. 58).
The case of S.L vs. Commission Scolaire Des Chenes deals with the request of 
parents to have their children exempted from a particular course in the Quebec 
schools system. Their complaint centred around their belief that this course would 
indoctrinate their children with values that were at odds with what the children were 
being taught at home and in church. It is important to note here that unlike the 
cases in Ontario and British Columbia, the parents were not asking that a particular 
action or course be removed from the school system because of their personal 
beliefs: they were asking that their minor children be exempted from the classes. 
This is a far less onerous task than was found in Zylberberg, Elgin County or 
Russow, all of which led to decisions that impacted the whole of education policy. 
That the Court’s decision went in a different direction suggests an entirely different 
dynamic: it was not enough for petitioners to be exempted from religious instruction. 
The entire curriculum for religious instruction was removed from the schools, despite 
efforts to be non-denominational and broad. Yet 24 years later, a mere request to be
exempted from the curriculum on religion was rejected. The exemption was denied 
first by the Ministry of Education and then by the Courts. The denial was because 
the Ministry of Education and the Courts did not feel that it was detrimental to the 
students to attend this course (and, indeed, determined that the new course was of 
value). Unlike the Ministry of Education and the Courts however, the parents did 
feel that it would be detrimental to their children’s development to have to attend the 
ECR course in the public school.
The next case I will examine is also from Quebec and also deals with the 
Ethics and Religious Culture course as designed by the Quebec government. This 
case is out of chronological order from the rest of the cases presented in this 
chapter, but that is because it deals with different issues. Unlike in the S.L. v. 
Commission des Chenes case, it is not a public school in question, but a private 
Catholic educational institution. Also, it is not parents suing the government but the 
institution itself. In this case, the judge found in favour of the plaintiff, Loyola High 
School. It was overturned on appeal.
Loyola High School v. Courschesne (2010): In this case, Loyola High School was 
seeking an exemption from the Ethics and Religious Culture program. The school 
and the judge both made an important differentiation between the program and 
course. The school was not looking to be exempted from teaching the course; they 
just did not feel that with their Catholic mandate they could teach the course using 
the program of the Ethics and Religious Culture course as mandated by the 
Government of Quebec. There are a number of reasons for this, but the key one is 
that the school felt, and the judge at the lower court agreed, that the program was
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too secular and relativist. The school wanted to teach the same material but from a
Catholic perspective. As the judge in the case wrote,
According to Loyola, the incompatibility of the ERC program 
established by the Minister stems from the fact that it inculcates a 
relativistic philosophy, commonly known as ‘normative pluralism’. The 
basic principles of that philosophy trivialize and, for all practical 
purposes, negate religious experience and belief” (Quebec Superior 
Court 2010, pp. 32).
As the judge notes in paragraph 42 of the judgment, “The ERC program is, for all 
practical purposes, the culmination of the process of secularization of public schools 
undertaken by the Quebec government.” The ruling goes on to state
...[Hjowever, most private schools still have a denominational 
character. Loyola’s denominational character is still recognized by the 
Quebec government, even though it is no longer guaranteed by the 
Constitution Act, 1867. Thus, the Ethics and Religious Culture course 
is in keeping with this secularization process in that it secularizes the 
teaching of ethics and religious culture (Quebec Superior Court 2010, 
pp. 47-48).
Douglas Farrow was an expert witness for the plaintiffs and as part of his testimony 
stated
... first, that the Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC) program 
represents a significant transfer of power from civil society to the state; 
second, that its ambitious goals belie any claim to neutrality; third, that 
the ERC program is intended to provide formation (i.e., to cultivate a 
world view and a way of thinking and acting consistent with that world 
view) and not merely information, and that the formation it hopes to 
provide is at points incompatible with a Catholic formation; fourth, that 
the imposition of this curriculum (with its compulsory pedagogy) on 
Catholic schools constitutes, from the perspective of the Catholic 
Church, a breach of fundamental rights as well as a defeat for certain 
of the program's own objectives in recognizing diversity (Quebec 
Superior Court 2010, pp. 25).
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The other plaintiff in the case was John Zucchi, a parent of a child attending Loyola 
who wanted the Catholic version of the program of the Ethics and Religious Culture 
course taught at the school.
There were two ‘Legal Aspects’ that were addressed in this case. One was 
Administrative Law, the other Constitutional law. I shall list them both, but for the 
purposes of this thesis only the constitutional law will be addressed in detail. As 
listed in the ruling, I replicate the questions directly:
Administrative law aspect
[80] Loyola argued that it is entitled to be exempt from the ERC 
program of studies established by the Minister for the teaching of the 
ERC course in the first and second cycle of secondary education.
[81] It contended that the Minister exceeded her jurisdiction in denying 
the exemption sought under the first paragraph of section 22 of the 
Regulation. To rule on this issue, the Court must answer the following 
two questions:
(a) What is the standard of review?
(b) Should the Minister’s decision be quashed, considering the 
appropriate standard of review?
Constitutional law aspect
(a) Does the Minister’s decision interfere with freedom of religion as 
guaranteed by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter or section 3 of the 
Quebec Charter? If so, can the interference be justified by the 
application of the first section of the Canadian Charter or section 9.1 of 
the Quebec Charter?
On the Administrative law questions, the judge found that on a technical basis the 
Minister has overstepped her bounds and Loyola was victorious on this point. In the 
decision, the Court wrote
Moreover, it is patently true that if the Minister’s November 13, 2008 
decision in and of itself or through its effect, interferes with Loyola’s
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freedom of religion it, must be considered unreasonable and, therefore, 
be quashed, according to the applicable principles of administrative 
justice (Quebec Superior Court 2010, pp. 204).
We shall now turn to the constitutional questions raised in this case, namely whether 
the Minister’s decision was an infringement on the Section 2 rights of the Canadian 
Charter or Section 3 of the Quebec Charter. While Section 2 of the Canadian 
Charter has been listed elsewhere, I feel it would be helpful to reproduce Section 3 
of the Quebec Charter here as well. This section states “Every person is the 
possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, freedom 
of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful 
assembly and freedom of association” (Quebec 2008)9.
The Quebec Superior Court found that it could not rule on the Canadian 
Charter question because the Supreme Court of Canada has not ruled yet whether a 
‘Legal Person’ has religious freedom protection. In paragraphs 207-209 of the 
judgment the Court found that it was also not able to make this determination at this 
time because of a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court. As to the question of 
religious freedom, the Court noted that
[l]n any event, freedom of religion and freedom of religious expression 
are an integral part of the founding principles of the rule of law. The 
principle of the rule of law is of benefit to all and is not limited solely to 
human beings (Quebec Superior Court 2010, pp. 220).
This finding makes the next determination so important and helped the judge make 
his ruling clear. In the preamble and sections 1 and 2 of the Quebec Charter, the 
drafters of the Quebec Charter used the term human beings. In section 3, the 
drafters used the term Persons (Quebec Superior Court 2010, pp. 222). This is an
9 Emphasis added
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important distinction, as the Quebec government has defined person to include 
natural and legal persons, “unless that is inconsistent with the law or with specific 
circumstances of the case.”
As further noted by the judge in paragraph 246
The fundamental freedom of religion has been interpreted broadly and 
includes “the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person 
chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of 
hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by 
worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination” (Quebec 
Superior Court 2010, pp. 246).
The point that should be stressed again is that this is a private institution and the 
case does not affect the public school system. In fact, parents in Quebec are 
guaranteed the right to provide the education they want for their children by section 
41 of the Quebec Charter which states
[Pjarents or the persons acting in their stead have a right to give their 
children a religious and moral education in keeping with their 
convictions and with proper regard for their children's rights and 
interests (Quebec 2008).
The constitutional issues in this case are settled quite clearly by the judge at this 
court level in the following two paragraphs, with reference to the Supreme Court.
In Amselem, the Supreme Court ruled that, to demonstrate the 
existence of interference with his freedom of religion, the plaintiff had 
to establish (a) that he sincerely believed in a practice or belief that 
had a nexus with religion and (b) that the third-party conduct alleged by 
him was detrimental in a more than trivial or insubstantial way to his 
capacity to comply with the practice or belief.
In the present case, the evidence is clear and uncontradicted. Loyola 
and its members, including Principal Donovan and President Fr. 
Brennan, are sincerely convinced that, to accomplish their mission as a 
Catholic educational institution, Loyola must teach ERC with its own 
program and according to the precepts of the Catholic religion.
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The testimony of Loyola’s principal, Mr. Donovan, was unequivocal.
The ten principles explained in the booklet “What makes a Jesuit High 
School Jesuit?” are present in all the activities of the school and in the 
teaching of all the courses, not only the religion course. The precepts 
of the Catholic religion are omnipresent at Loyola (Quebec Superior 
Court 2010, pp. 264-266).
The Court also found that the actions of the Minister could not be saved under 
section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter. Section 9.1 is similar to Section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in that it limits the rights and freedoms 
outlined.
In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall 
maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the 
general well-being of the citizens of Quebec. In this respect, the scope 
of the freedoms and rights, and limits to their exercise, may be fixed by 
law (Quebec 2008).
In the Epilogue to his ruling, Justice Dugre is quite firm in his judgment. He is not 
willing to accept the actions of the Minister in denying Loyola High School an 
exemption. He notes that in the Act establishing the position and authority of the 
Minister, one of the whereas clauses states “parents have the right to chose(sic) the 
institutions which, according to their convictions, ensure the greatest respect for the 
rights of their children.”
Justice Dugre could not be clearer in his rulihg on this matter. In summation 
of his ruling, he went further than might have been expected. If his ruling is upheld 
all the way by the Supreme Court of Canada on appeal, it may have lasting 
consequences for other private schools in Canada facing the same dilemma.
Justice Dugre stated,
To paraphrase Beetz J.’s comments in Slaight Communications Inc.— 
comments that pertain to freedom of expression but are just as
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relevant to freedom of religious expression—the obligation imposed 
on Loyola to teach the ERC course in a secular manner is 
totalitarian in nature and essentially tantamount to the command 
given to Galileo by the Inquisition to abjure the cosmology of 
Copernicus.10
In short, the Court is of the opinion, firstly, that the Minister cannot 
dictate to Loyola, a private Catholic college, the approach to teaching 
the compulsory ERC course to its students and, secondly, that Loyola 
is entitled to the exemption sought because its program for teaching 
ERC is equivalent to that established by the Minister (Quebec Superior 
Court 2010, pp. 331-332).
By making such a deliberate and strong judgment, it is likely that the Justice hoped 
to avoid being overturned on appeal. It remains to be seen what the outcome will be 
on appeal, but it is possible that if upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, other 
private schools in Canada may also want to have an exemption to the material they 
are required to teach as part of a standard curriculum. Whether this will be a good 
development for society or not remains to be seen.
The Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the lower court ruling in December of 
2012. As Douglas Farrow notes, Justice Fournier writing for the Court of Appeal 
declared the infringement on Loyola to be “a very minor and justifiable one.” As 
Farrow also notes, this is not about simply making a community desist from taking 
certain action, or denying them a right if they do not subscribe to certain activities. 
The example he uses is pictures for driver’s licenses. If you don’t want a picture you 
cannot drive. This, as Farrow notes, is altogether different. Here the government is 
forcing a religious community to do something that goes against their beliefs.
10 [Emphasis added]
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The trial judge in Loyola High School v. Courschesne found that the Loyola 
petitioners sincerely believed that their religious liberty was being infringed by the 
action of the Quebec government due to the Minister’s failure to grant an exemption 
to the programme of the ERC. As noted in the Court of Appeal judgement the case, 
person must “establish that he sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a 
nexus with his religion” (Quebec Court of Appeal 2012, pp. 165). The Court of 
Appeal argue that the trial judge has made an error in that he argues that "in short, 
established by the Minister, the Loyola ERC program requires a pedagogy 
that is contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church” (Quebec Court of 
Appeal 2012, pp. 170).
The court o f appeal makes their final ruling very clear in that they are 
not sympathetic to the respondents (Loyola and Zucchi) in this case. The 
court summarized their ruling by noting
[ 175 ] In summary, I think the judge errs in basing its judgment 
on expert opinion Farrow. There is no real effect or, at least, it is 
not significant.
[ 176 ] Even supposing that infringement been has reached, I am 
of the opinion that such infringement is justified (Quebec Court of 
Appeal 2012, pp. 175-176).
It is also useful to quote one of the last sections of the Conclusion of the 
ruling, where the Justice gives his final arguments. Here he notes that 
the Minister was fully justified in making the decision outlined earlier to 
deny Loyola High School an exemption to the programme of the ERC.
The Justice stated
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[ 185 ] The power of the Minister is discretionary in nature and 
has not been exercised for purposes other than those prescribed 
by law and regulations. The decision of the Minister is reasonable 
and does not affect a protected right (Quebec Court of Appeal 
2012, pp. 185).
This shows that the Quebec Court of Appeal recognized that this choice was 
optional on the part of the Minister, and not one of statutory or regulatory 
requirement. Thus the decision of the Minister is yet another example of the 
movement away from the dominant Christian Civic Piety and the adoption of the 
democratic faith form of civil religion across Canada.
The Loyola case is about the right of a religious group to be able to practice 
their faith in the manner they deem appropriate. In this case however, the 
government, supported by the Court of Appeal in Quebec, is using the power of the 
state to force a religious community to follow the dictates of the state. While it is 
permissible for the state to require certain activities from all members, such 
requirements are not to violate fundamental rights and freedoms. The state in the 
Loyola case is trying to force a group to do something against its principles. The 
state claims that the ERC course is neutral on its face, but the trial judge found this 
not to be the case. It is important to remember, as the Supreme Court noted in Big 
M Drug Mart, that freedom of religion also means freedom from religion. Yet religion, 
broadly defined, might also include those dogmatic truths that are both religious and 
secular. The actions of the Quebec government are an example of the new 
democratic faith civil religion in Canada.
In the exemplars from Quebec, we see part of the full effect of the Quiet 
Revolution on display. One of the major reforms of the Quiet Revolution was the
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increased influence and control by the state. As I have shown, the Quiet Revolution 
was not just a period of increased Francophone nationalism, but was also a time of 
increased secularization in the province of Quebec. With the introduction of the 
Ethics and Religion Course which forbade even the religious private schools of using 
their own programmes to teach the material/the state in Quebec can now be said to 
be one step closer to being fully secular.
These actions are examples of the democratic faith in Canada because they 
are designed to further secularize society. They indeed to do this by even extending 
the ERC course, an admirable course in itself, to the religious schools that feel they 
cannot teach this course due to their faith. As was noted in paragraph 42 of the 
initial trial judgment, “The ERC program is, for all practical purposes, the culmination 
of the process of secularization of public schools undertaken by the Quebec 
government.” That the Quebec government refused to grant Loyola High School’s 
request to be given an exemption to the programme content but not the course itself 
shows that it is more than just the public schools the government is trying to 
influence. This is the democratic faith showing through, when the government 
moves from not just influencing the public domain, but also seeks to influence the 
private domain of society.
In this chapter I have reviewed six cases. Not all the changes were welcomed 
by all the people over time, but there is now, in Ontario at least, a situation where the 
matter of religion in the public schools is settled. The funding question of private 
schools is also settled as a constitutional issue. That being said, there is nothing
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legally stopping a future Ontario government from extending public funding to private 
religious schools if it so chooses.
In the Quebec cases I have looked at, it seems that the public school 
question of the Ethic and Religious Culture course is settled for now, although if 
Justices LeBel and Fish are correct, it could become an issue there again as well. 
As to how the issue of the Ethics and Religious Culture course and programme in 
Quebec private schools is to be settled that will be decided on the forthcoming 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The metamorphosis of the civil religion I have written about has not reached 
an endpoint. This tension will likely continue for some time as different value 
systems compete for the lifeblood of support that is Canadian opinion.
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Conclusion
This thesis stems from an enduring interest I have had in religion, politics and 
society, which all intersect in this study. The purpose of this thesis has been to 
investigate civil religion in the Canadian context. This thesis asserts that Canada 
cultivated a civil religion, albeit with disparate strains, which I have identified as 
Christian civic piety. This civil religion was more than a collection of symbols and 
rituals, and both animated and impacted public policy, especially in the realm of 
education. Of particular relevance in the contemporary period, is the metamorphosis 
of this Christian civic piety to a new democratic faith. The purpose of this concluding 
chapter is to provide a summary of the research conducted and provide some 
concluding remarks about the relevance of this study.
First, I examined whether Canada has a civil religion. The answer in this 
thesis is that Canada has and always has had a civil religion. There were originally 
two, based on the Roman Catholics found mostly in Quebec, and the protestants 
found mostly in the rest of the country. These civil religions were based on Christian 
civic piety as outlined in the thesis. This civic piety has changed to be based on a 
new democratic faith as outlined in thesis. The Christian civic piety civil religion was 
based on a more Durkheimian nature, where the values were derived from the 
people and society, whereas the new democratic faith is more Rousseauian and has 
more state involvement.
In the first chapter, this thesis outlined the concept of what civil religion is and 
what it is not and whether or not Canada has a civil religion. In the words of Bellah,
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civil religion is a “set of beliefs, symbols and rituals” (R. N. Bellah, Civil Religion in 
America 1967, 4). But it is also more than that. Civil religion also animates and 
influences public policy. I have shown, for example, how Christian civic piety was 
commonly promoted and practiced throughout the public education systems of 
Canada. The second question this thesis sought to address is, “what happened to 
the traditional Christian civic piety in Canada?" As such, I followed a descriptive as 
opposed to a normative approach. A normative approach would have led to a 
conclusion about what should have been, whereas this thesis sought to answer what 
was, what changed and what the situation is now. This descriptive approach started 
out with a discussion about the nature of civil religion, and then moved on to how 
this applied to Canada. Early manifestations of civil religion were based on the faith 
of the Canadian people. The new civil religion, especially in the post Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms era, is more state centric in imputing values to 
Canadians. This change is what von Heyking and others have called the “democratic 
faith” form of civil religion. This “democratic faith” form of civil religion now 
dominates public policy in the realm of public education. Tocqueville wrote that 
religious institutions are important training grounds for democracy as they teach 
people how to function in a collective group. This, I would argue, also applies to 
religious training and education. It is important to note, however, that the purpose of 
this education and training reflect Ryerson’s desire, to create better citizens, and not 
just for the betterment or growth of the religion itself.
The Durkheimian form of civil religion emanates from society and the social 
norms of the given society in question. As the society in question is derived from the
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people, the people have more of a say in what the social norms and values will 
reflect. The Rousseauian civil religion, or the democratic faith von Heyking speaks 
of, is more state oriented and derives more of its values in a top down fashion from 
the state to the people. This is a significant difference in that the new civil religion 
represents a different relationship between state and society.
One of the changes I have shown in how the different educational cases were 
handled is the exemption provision in law. The Ontario cases all provided for 
exemptions for the students who were not willing to sit through religious education or 
exercises. These exemptions were not considered sufficient to protect these 
students. Now, in the Quebec Drummondville case, I have shown that exemption is 
considered too much of a burden on the goals of the state.
The new democratic faith civil religion is more Rousseauian in nature than the 
traditional Christian civic piety which was Durkheimian in tradition. This difference 
relates to the influence the state and the society had on the people. In the 
Rousseauian democratic faith, the state is much more willing to add its influence 
directly on the people to pursue its own goals. In the Durkheimian tradition, the 
people who make up the society are the ones who influence the norms and values of 
the state. In the role of education, I have shown that the state is now more engaged 
in influencing the religious values of the people and that there is less room for the 
people to influence the outcome. If the Loyola plaintiffs are successful in their 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, that success will be one small victory for 
society as it will have national implications for the role of religious freedom and 
education in Canada. If they are unsuccessful, it may still have a national influence,
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but this time it will be more of a Rousseauian influence, and the role of religion will 
be relegated to the private sphere even more.
As demonstrated in the thesis, Canada’s civil religion started to change in the 
1960s when the role of the churches and religion in general started to wane parallel 
to the emerging role of the state. This did not mean that the churches and religion in 
general were completely out of the picture, as demonstrated by the debate about the 
proposed Canadian Bill of Rights. At first, the role of a deity was not referenced in 
the Bill, but this changed to include an explicit reference to God. Note this was not a 
reference to Christianity or Christ specifically, but just to a general ‘Judeo-Christian’ 
God.
This shift in civil religion leads to the title of this thesis, From God to 
Mammon: The Metamorphosis o f Civil Religion in Canada. This title accurately 
captures what the thesis presents as it starts with Christian civic piety and 
transforms Canada into a secular based state, where man is in control of events 
without reliance on a Christian deity. This shift to the reliance on the temporal (with 
some poetic license to expand on the material focus of the term Mammon) reflects a 
fundamental shift to the democratic faith form of civil religion. The original state of 
affairs in Canada saw a country with a strong Christian basis, both in Quebec and 
the rest of Canada. This state of affairs was reflected in society and in institutions of 
the state and society. This included the churches and the schools. The schools are 
the main focus of this thesis as that is where the exemplars in Chapter Four come 
from. The exemplars come from British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec.
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The role of religion in the schools in Ontario also increased in the 20th century 
where religious exercises were expanded. The first half of the 20th century also saw 
the inclusion of religious education in the school system in Ontario. These religious 
exercises were given two half hour periods weekly and were introduced in 1944. 
This is the same year that religious education was introduced in British Columbia 
and shows the rising role of religion in Canadian society at the time, as governments 
were merely responding to the wishes of society with the introduction of these 
courses. In Quebec it was different, as the school system was fully denominational 
at this time, and it can be presumed that religion was central to the instructional 
material being offered in Quebec.
The role of the state has evolved considerably since the foundation of 
Canada in 1867. This Confederation of the four colonies to create Canada was 
completed only with considerable negotiation and compromise. One of the greatest 
compromises concerned education, particularly concerning to Lower Canada 
(Quebec) and Upper Canadian (Ontario) Fathers of Confederation. This 
compromise allowed for the establishment of religious education in Ontario and 
Quebec. In Ontario, the system was separated into the public Catholic system and a 
Christian, non-sectarian public system. It is worth repeating here the words of 
Gidney and Millar
the centrality of Christian doctrine in Ontario’s public schools, albeit in 
a nondenominational Protestant form, was alive and well in the mid- 
twentieth-century; still alive, though less well, as late as the mid-1960s; 
and, even in the last third of the century, finally ousted only through a 
prolonged, contested process. (Gidney and Millar 2001, 275)
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This quote demonstrates that the public system in Ontario was infused with 
Protestant ethic throughout its history. As discussed in Chapter four, the Supreme 
Court seems to have ignored this history in its ruling on the Adler case. This case 
centered on the funding of non-Roman Catholic religious private schools. The court 
said there was no discrimination because the system was set up that way in the 
Confederation compromise.
This thesis ends with the case of Loyola vs. Courschesne. This case is out of 
chronological order to the others, but it provides a good ending point for the thesis. 
While the plaintiff, Loyola High School was successful at the Divisional Court this 
ruling was overturned by the Quebec Court of Appeal. As the Loyola case is now 
before the Supreme Court of Canada, it will be interesting to see if the court 
overturns the Quebec Court of Appeal and reinstates the trial judge’s ruling.
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